We develop a general game-theoretic framework for reasoning about strategic agents performing possibly costly computation. In this framework, many traditional game-theoretic results (such as the existence of a Nash equilibrium) no longer hold. Nevertheless, we can use the framework to provide psychologically appealing explanations to observed behavior in well-studied games (such as finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma and rock-paper-scissors). Furthermore, we provide natural conditions on games sufficient to guarantee that equilibria exist. As an application of this framework, we consider a notion of game-theoretic implementation of mediators in computational games. We show that a special case of this notion is equivalent to a variant of the traditional cryptographic definition of protocol security; this result shows that, when taking computation into account, the two approaches used for dealing with "deviating" players in two different communities-Nash equilibrium in game theory, and zero-knowledge "simulation" in cryptography-are intimately connected.
Game Theory with Costly Computation
Consider the following game. You are given a random odd n-bit number x and you are supposed to decide whether x is prime or composite. If you guess correctly you receive $2, if you guess incorrectly you instead have to pay a penalty of $1000. Additionally you have the choice of "playing safe" by giving up, in which case you receive $1. In traditional game theory, computation is considered "costless"; in other words, players are allowed to perform an unbounded amount of computation without it affecting their utility. Traditional game theory suggests that you should compute whether x is prime or composite and output the correct answer; this is the only Nash equilibrium of the one-person game, no matter what n (the size of the prime) is. Although for small n this seems reasonable, when n grows larger most people would probably decide to "play safe"-as eventually the cost of computing the answer (e.g., by buying powerful enough computers) outweighs the possible gain of $1.
The importance of considering such computational issues in game theory has been recognized since at least the work of Simon [1955] . There have been a number of attempts to capture various aspects of computation. Two major lines of research can be identified. The first line, initiated by Neyman [1985] , tries to model the fact that players can do only bounded computation, typically by modeling players as finite automata. (See [Papadimitriou and Yannakakis 1994] and the references therein for more recent work on modeling players as finite automata; a more recent approach, first considered by Urbano and Villa [2004] and formalized by Dodis, Halevi and Rabin [2000] , instead models players as polynomially bounded Turing machine.) The second line, initiated by Rubinstein [1986] , tries to capture the fact that doing costly computation affects an agent's utility. Rubinstein assumed that players choose a finite automaton to play the game rather than choosing a strategy directly; a player's utility depends both on the move made by the automaton and the complexity of the automaton (identified with the number of states of the automaton). Intuitively, automata that use more states are seen as representing more complicated procedures. (See [Kalai 1990 ] for an overview of the work in this area in the 1980s, and [Ben-Sasson, Kalai, and Kalai 2007] for more recent work.)
Our focus is on providing a general game-theoretic framework for reasoning about agents performing costly computation. As in Rubinstein's work, we view players as choosing a machine, but for us the machine is a Turing machine, rather than a finite automaton. We associate a complexity, not just with a machine, but with the machine and its input. The complexity could represent the running time of or space used by the machine on that input. The complexity can also be used to capture the complexity of the machine itself (e.g., the number of states, as in Rubinstein's case) or to model the cost of searching for a new strategy to replace one that the player already has. For example, if a mechanism designer recommends that player i use a particular strategy (machine) M , then there is a cost for searching for a better strategy; switching to another strategy may also entail a psychological cost. By allowing the complexity to depend on the machine and the input, we can deal with the fact that machines run much longer on some inputs than on others. A player's utility depends both on the actions chosen by all the players' machines and the complexity of these machines. Note that, in general, unlike earlier papers, player i's utility may depend not just on the complexity of i's machine, but also on the complexity of the machines of other players. For example, it may be important to player 1 to compute an answer to a problem before player 2.
In this setting, we can define Nash equilibrium in the obvious way. However, as we show by a simple example (a rock-paper-scissors game where randomization is costly), a Nash equilibrium may not always exist. Other standard results in the game theory, such as the revelation principle (which, roughly speaking, says that there is always an equilibrium where players truthfully report their types, i.e., their private information [Myerson 1979; Forges 1986 ]) also do not hold. We view this as a feature. We believe that taking computation into account should force us to rethink a number of basic notions. To this end, we introduce refinements of Nash equilibrium that take into account the computational aspects of games. We also show that the non-existence of Nash equilibrium is not such a significant problem. A Nash equilibrium does exist for many computational games of interest, and can help explain experimentally-observed phenomena in games such as repeated prisoner's dilemma in a psychologically appealing way. Moreover, there are natural conditions (such as the assumption that randomizing is free) that guarantee the existence of Nash equilibrium in computational games.
Implementing Mediators in Computational Games
It is often simpler to design, and analyze, mechanisms when assuming that players have access to a trusted mediator through which they can communicate. Equally often, however, such a trusted mediator is hard to find. A central question in both cryptography and game theory is investigating under what circumstances mediators can be replaced-or implemented-by simple "unmediated" communication between the players. There are some significant differences between the approaches used by the two communities to formalize this question.
The cryptographic notion of a secure computation [Goldreich, Micali, and Wigderson 1986] considers two types of players: honest players and malicious players. Roughly speaking, a protocol Π is said to securely implement the mediator F if (1) the malicious players cannot influence the output of the communication phase any more than they could have by communicating directly with the mediator; this is called correctness, and (2) the malicious players cannot "learn" more than what can be efficiently computed from only the output of mediator; this is called privacy. These properties are formalized through the zero-knowledge simulation paradigm [Goldwasser, Micali, and Rackoff 1989] : roughly, we require that any "harm" done by an adversary in the protocol execution could be simulated by a polynomially-bounded Turing machine, called the simulator, that communicates only with the mediator. Three levels of security are usually considered: perfect, statistical, and computational. Roughly speaking, perfect security guarantees that correctness and privacy hold with probability 1; statistical security allows for a "negligible" error probability; and computational security considers only adversaries that can be implemented by polynomially-bounded Turing machines.
The traditional game-theoretic notion of implementation (see [Forges 1986; Forges 1990] ) does not explicitly consider properties such as privacy and correctness, but instead requires that the implementation preserve a given Nash equilibrium of the mediated game. Roughly speaking, a protocol Π game-theoretically implements a mediator F if, given any game G for which it is an equilibrium for the players to provide their types to F and output what F recommends, running Π on the same inputs is also an equilibrium. In other words, whenever a set of parties have incentives to truthfully provide their types to the mediator, they also have incentives to honestly run the protocol Π using the same inputs. 1 Roughly speaking, the key differences between the notions are that the game-theoretic notion does not consider computational issues and the cryptographic notion does not consider incentives. The game-theoretic notion thus talks about preserving Nash equilibria (which cannot be done in the cryptographic notion, since there are no incentives), while the cryptographic notion talks about security against malicious adversaries.
mediators. It follows immediately from our result that known protocols ( [Micali and Pass 2006; Micali and Pass 2007; Goldreich, Micali, and Wigderson 1987; Ben-Or, Goldwasser, and Wigderson 1988; Izmalkov, Lepinski, and Micali 2008; Canetti 2000] ) can be used to obtain universal implementations. Moreover, lower bounds for the traditional notion of secure computation immediately yield lower bounds for universal implementation.
At first sight, our equivalence result might seem like a negative result: it demonstrates that considering only rational players (as opposed to arbitrary malicious players, as in cryptographic notions of implementation) does not facilitate protocol design. We emphasize, however, that for the equivalence to hold, we must consider implementations universal with respect to essentially all computational games. In many settings it might be reasonable to consider implementations universal with respect to only certain subclasses of games; in such scenarios, universal implementations may be significantly simpler or more efficient, and may also circumvent traditional lower bounds. For instance, in some settings it might be reasonable to assume that players strictly prefer to compute less, that players do not want to be caught "cheating", or that players might not be concerned about the privacy of part of their inputs; these different assumptions can be captured by specifying appropriate subclasses of games (see Section 4.2 for more details). We believe that this extra generality is an important advantage of a fully game-theoretic definition, which does not rely on the traditional cryptographic simulation paradigm.
Outline
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe our framework. In Section 3, we apply the framework to obtain a computational notion of implementations of mediators, and in Section 4 we demonstrate how this notion is related to the cryptographic notion of secure computation. We conclude in Section 5 with potential new directions of research made possible by our framework.
A Computational Game-Theoretic Framework

Bayesian Games
We model costly computation using Bayesian machine games. To explain our approach, we first review the standard notion of a Bayesian game. A Bayesian game is a game of incomplete information, where each player makes a single move. The "incomplete information" is captured by assuming that nature makes an initial move, and chooses for each player i a type in some set T i . Player i's type can be viewed as describing i's private information. For ease of exposition, we assume in this paper that the set N of players is always [m] = {1, . . . , m}, for some m. If N = [m], the set T = T 1 × . . . × T m is the type space. As is standard, we assume that there is a commonly-known probability distribution Pr on the type space T . Each player i must choose an action from a space A i of actions. Let A = A 1 × . . . × A n be the set of action profiles. A Bayesian game is characterized by the tuple ([m] , T, A, Pr, u), where [m] is the set of players, T is the type space, A is the set of joint actions, and u is the utility function, where u i ( t, a) is player i's utility (or payoff) if the type profile is t and action profile a is played.
In general, a player's choice of action will depend on his type. A strategy for player i is a function from T i to ∆(A i ) (where, as usual, we denote by ∆(X) the set of distributions on the set X). If σ is a strategy for player i, t ∈ T i and a ∈ A i , then σ(t)(a) denotes the probability of action a according to the distribution on acts induced by σ(t). Given a joint strategy σ, we can take u σ i to be the random variable on the type space T defined by taking u σ i ( t) = a∈A (σ 1 (t 1 )(a 1 )×. . .×σ m (t m )(a m ))u i ( t, a). Player i's expected utility if σ is played, denoted U i ( σ), is then just E Pr [u σ i ] = t∈T Pr( t)u σ i ( t).
Bayesian Machine Games
In a Bayesian game, it is implicitly assumed that computing a strategy-that is, computing what move to make given a type-is free. We want to take the cost of computation into account here.
To this end, we consider what we call Bayesian machine games, where we replace strategies by machines.
For definiteness, we take the machines to be Turing machines, although the exact choice of computing formalism is not significant for our purposes. Given a type, a strategy in a Bayesian game returns a distribution over actions. Similarly, given as input a type, the machine returns a distribution over actions. As is standard, we model the distribution by assuming that the machine actually gets as input not only the type, but a random string of 0s and 1s (which can be thought of as the sequence of heads and tails), and then (deterministically) outputs an action. Just as we talk about the expected utility of a strategy profile in a Bayesian game, we can talk about the expected utility of a machine profile in a Bayesian machine game. However, we can no longer compute the expected utility by just taking the expectation over the action profiles that result from playing the game. A player's utility depends not only on the type profile and action profile played by the machine, but also on the "complexity" of the machine given an input. The complexity of a machine can represent, for example, the running time or space usage of the machine on that input, the size of the program description, or some combination of these factors. For simplicity, we describe the complexity by a single number, although, since a number of factors may be relevant, it may be more appropriate to represent it by a tuple of numbers in some cases. (We can, of course, always encode the tuple as a single number, but in that case, "higher" complexity is not necessarily worse.) Note that when determining player i's utility, we consider the complexity of all machines in the profile, not just that of i's machine. For example, i might be happy as long as his machine takes fewer steps than j's.
We assume that nature has a type in {0, 1} * . While there is no need to include a type for nature in standard Bayesian games (we can effectively incorporate nature's type into the type of the players), once we take computation into account, we obtain a more expressive class of games by allowing nature to have a type. (since the complexity of computing the utility may depend on nature's type). We assume that machines take as input strings of 0s and 1s and output strings of 0s and 1s. Thus, we assume that both types and actions can be represented as elements of {0, 1} * . We allow machines to randomize, so given a type as input, we actually get a distribution over strings. To capture this, we assume that the input to a machine is not only a type, but also a string chosen with uniform probability from {0, 1} ∞ (which we can view as the outcome of an infinite sequence of coin tosses). Implicit in the representation above is the assumption that machines terminate with probability 1, so the output is a finite string. 3 We define a view to be a pair (t, r) of two finite bitstrings; we think of t as that part of the type that is read, and r is the string of random bits used. (Our definition is slightly different from the traditional way of defining a view, in that we include only the parts of the type and the random sequence actually read. If computation is not taken into account, there is no loss in generality in including the full type and the full random sequence, and this is what has traditionally been done in the literature. However, when computation is costly, this might no longer be the case.) We denote by t; r a string in {0, 1} * ; {0, 1} * representing the view. Note that here and elsewhere, we use ";" as a special symbol that acts as a separator between strings in {0, 1} * . If v = (t; r), we take M (v) to be the output of M given input type t and random string r · 0 ∞ .
We use a complexity function C : M × {0, 1} * ; {0, 1} * → IN , where M denotes the set of Turing Machines that terminate with probability 1, to describe the complexity of a machine given a view.
Given our intuition that the only machines that can have a complexity of 0 are those that "do nothing", we require that, for all complexity functions C , C (M, v) = 0 for some view v iff M = ⊥ iff C (M, v) = 0 for all views v, where ⊥ is a canonical represent of the TM that does nothing: it does not read its input, has no state changes, and writes nothing. If t ∈ {0, 1} * and r ∈ {0, 1} ∞ , we identify C (M, t; r) with C (M, t; r ′ ), where r ′ is the finite prefix of r actually used by M when running on input t with random string r.
For now, we assume that machines run in isolation, so the output and complexity of a machine does not depend on the machine profile. We remove this restriction in the next section.
Definition 2.1 (Bayesian machine game) A Bayesian machine game G is described by a tuple ([m] , M, T, Pr, C 1 , . . . , C m , u 1 , . . . , u m ), where
m} is the set of players;
• M is the set of possible machines; • Pr is a distribution on T ;
• C i is a complexity function;
a, c) is the utility of player i if t is the type profile, a is the action profile (where we identify i's action with M i 's output), and c is the profile of machine complexities.
We can now define the expected utility of a machine profile. Given a Bayesian machine game G = ([m], M, Pr, T, C , u), t ∈ T , and M ∈ M m , define the random variable u G, M i on T ×({0, 1} ∞ ) m (i.e., the space of type profiles and sequences of random strings) by taking
Note that there are two sources of uncertainty in computing the expected utility: the type t and realization of the random coin tosses of the players, which is an element of ({0, 1} ∞ ) k . Let Pr k U denote the uniform distribution on ({0, 1} ∞ ) k . Given an arbitrary distribution Pr X on a space X, we write Pr
or not relevant, we often omit it, writing Pr U and Pr + X . Thus, given the probability Pr on T , the expected utility of player i in game G if M is used is the expectation of the random variable u G, M i with respect to the distribution Pr + (technically, Pr +m ):
Note that this notion of utility allows an agent to prefer a machine that runs faster to one that runs slower, even if they give the same output, or to prefer a machine that has faster running time to one that gives a better output. Because we allow the utility to depend on the whole profile of complexities, we can capture a situation where i can be "happy" as long as his machine runs faster than j's machine. Of course, an important special case is where i's utility depends only on his own complexity. All of our technical results continue to hold if we make this restriction.
Nash Equilibrium in Machine Games
Given the definition of utility above, we can now define (ǫ-) Nash equilibrium in the standard way.
Definition 2.2 (Nash equilibrium in machine games) Given a Bayesian machine game G, a machine profile M , and
(As usual, M −i denotes the tuple consisting of all machines in M other than
There is an important conceptual point that must be stressed with regard to this definition. Because we are implicitly assuming, as is standard in the game theory literature, that the game is common knowledge, we are assume that the agents understand the costs associated with each Turing machine. That is, they do not have to do any "exploration" to compute the costs. In addition, we do not charge the players for computing which machine is the best one to use in a given setting; we assume that this too is known. This model is appropriate in settings where the players have enough experience to understand the behavior of all the machines on all relevant inputs, either through experimentation or theoretical analysis. We can easily extend the model to incorporate uncertainty, by allowing the complexity function to depend on the state (type) of nature as well as the machine and the input; see Example 2.4 for further discussion of this point.
One immediate advantage of taking computation into account is that we can formalize the intuition that ǫ-Nash equilibria are reasonable, because players will not bother changing strategies for a gain of ǫ. Intuitively, the complexity function can "charge" ǫ for switching strategies. Specifically, an ǫ-Nash equilibrium M can be converted to a Nash equilibrium by modifying player i's complexity function to incorporate the overhead of switching from M i to some other strategy, and having player i's utility function decrease by ǫ ′ > ǫ if the switching cost is nonzero; we omit the formal details here. Thus, the framework lets us incorporate explicitly the reasons that players might be willing to play an ǫ-Nash equilibrium.
Although the notion of Nash equilibrium in Bayesian machine games is defined in the same way as Nash equilibrium in standard Bayesian games, the introduction of complexity leads to some significant differences in their properties. We highlight a few of them here. First, note that our definition of a Nash equilibrium considers behavioral strategies, which in particular might be randomized. It is somewhat more common in the game-theory literature to consider mixed strategies, which are probability distributions over deterministic strategies. As long as agents have perfect recall, mixed strategies and behavioral strategies are essentially equivalent [Kuhn 1953 ]. However, in our setting, since we might want to charge for the randomness used in a computation, such an equivalence does not necessarily hold.
Mixed strategies are needed to show that Nash equilibrium always exists in standard Bayesian games. As the following example shows, since we can charge for randomization, a Nash equilibrium may not exist in a Bayesian machine game, even if we restrict our attention to games where the type space and the output space are finite.
Example 2.3 Consider the 2-player Bayesian game of roshambo (rock-paper-scissors). Here the type space has size 1 (the players have no private information). We model playing rock, paper, and scissors as playing 0, 1, and 2, respectively. The payoff to player 1 of the outcome (i, j) is 1 if i = j ⊕ 1 (where ⊕ denotes addition mod 3), −1 if j = i ⊕ 1, and 0 if i = j. Player 2's playoffs are the negative of those of player 1; the game is a zero-sum game. As is well known, the unique Nash equilibrium of this game has the players randomizing uniformly between 0, 1, and 2. Now consider a machine game version of roshambo. Suppose that we take the complexity of a deterministic strategy to be 1, and the complexity of strategy that uses randomization to be 2, and take player i's utility to be his payoff in the underlying Bayesian game minus the complexity of his strategy. Intuitively, programs involving randomization are more complicated than those that do not randomize. With this utility function, it is easy to see that there is no Nash equilibrium. For suppose that (M 1 , M 2 ) is an equilibrium. If M 1 is uses randomization, then 1 can do better by playing the deterministic strategy j ⊕ 1, where j is the action that gets the highest probability according to M 2 (or is the deterministic choice of player 2 if M 2 does not use randomization). Similarly, M 2 cannot use randomization. But it is well known (and easy to check) that there is no equilibrium for roshambo with deterministic strategies. (Of course, there is nothing special about the costs of 1 and 2 for deterministic vs. randomized strategies. This argument works as long as all three deterministic strategies have the same cost, and it is less than that of a randomized strategy.)
Now consider the variant where we do not charge for the first, say, 10,000 steps of computation, and after that there is a positive cost of computation. It is not hard to show that, in finite time, using coin tossing with equal likelihood of heads and tails, we cannot exactly compute a uniform distribution over the three choices, although we can approximate it closely. 5 (For example, if we toss a coin twice, playing rock if we get heads twice, paper with heads and tails, scissors with tails and heads, and try again with two tails, we do get a uniform distribution, except for the small probability of nontermination.) From this observation it easily follows, as above, that there is no Nash equilibrium in this game either. As a corollary, it follows that that there are computational games without a Nash equilibrium where all constant-time strategies are taken to be free. It is well known that people have difficulty simulating randomization; we can think of the cost for randomizing as capturing this difficulty. Interestingly, there are roshambo tournaments (indeed, even a Rock Paper Scissors World Championship), and books written on roshambo strategies [Walker and Walker 2004] . Championship players are clearly not randomizing uniformly (they could not hope to get a higher payoff than an opponent by randomizing). Our framework provides a psychologically plausible account of this lack of randomization.
The key point here is that, in standard Bayesian games, to guarantee equilibrium requires using randomization. Here, we allow randomization, but we charge for it. This charge may prevent there from being an equilibrium. Example 2.3 shows that sometimes there is no Nash equilibrium. It is also trivial to show that given any standard Bayesian game G (without computational costs) and a computable strategy profile σ in G (where σ is computable if, for each player i and type t of player i, there exists a Turing machine M that outputs a with probability σ i (t)(a)), we can choose computational costs and modify the utility function in G in such a way as to make σ an equilibrium of the modified game: we simply make the cost to player i of implementing a strategy other than σ i sufficiently high.
One might be tempted to conclude from these examples that Bayesian machine games are uninteresting. They are not useful prescriptively, since they do not always provide a prescription as to the right thing to do. Nor are they useful descriptively, since we can always "explain" the use of a particular strategy in our framework as the result of a high cost of switching to another strategy. With regard to the first point, as shown by our definition of security, our framework can provide useful prescriptive insights by making minimal assumptions regarding the form of the complexity function. Moreover, although there may not always be a Nash equilibrium, it is easy to see that there is always an ǫ-Nash equilibrium for some ǫ; this ǫ-Nash can give useful guidance into how the game should be played. For example, in the second variant of the roshambo example above, we can get an ǫ-equilibrium for a small ǫ by attempting to simulate the uniform distribution by tossing the coin 10,000 times, and then just playing rock if 10,000 tails are tossed. Whether it is worth continuing the simulation after 10,000 tails depends on the cost of the additional computation. Finally, as we show below, there are natural classes of games where a Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to exist (see Section 2.4). With regard to the second point, we would argue that, in fact, it is the case that people continue to play certain strategies that they know are not optimal because of the overhead of switching to a different strategy; that is, our model captures a real-world phenomenon.
A third property of (standard) Bayesian games that does not hold for Bayesian machine games is the following. Given a Nash equilibrium σ in a Bayesian game, not only is σ i a best response to σ −i , but it continues to be a best response conditional on i's type. That is, if Pr is the probability distribution on types, and Pr
is the expected utility of σ conditional on player i having type i. Intuitively, if player i could do better than playing σ i if his type were t i by playing σ ′ i , then σ i would not be a best response to σ −i ; we could just modify σ i to agree with σ ′ i when i's type is t i to get a strategy that does better against σ −i than σ i . This is no longer true with Bayesian machine games, as the following simple example shows.
Example 2.4 Suppose that the probability on the type space assigns uniform probability to all 2 100 odd numbers between 2 100 and 2 101 (represented as bit strings of length 100). Suppose that a player i wants to compute if its input (i.e., its type) is prime. Specifically, i gets a utility of 2 minus the costs of its running time (explained below) if t is prime and it outputs 1 or if t is composite and it outputs 0; on the other hand, if it outputs either 0 or 1 and gets the wrong answer, then it gets a utility of −1000. But i also has the option of "playing safe"; if i outputs 2, then i gets a utility of 1 no matter what the input is. The running-time cost is taken to be 0 if i's machine takes less than 2 units of time and otherwise is −2. We assume that outputting a constant function takes 1 unit of time. Note that although testing for primality is in polynomial time, it will take more than 2 units of time on all inputs that have positive probability. Since i's utility is independent of what other players do, i's best response is to always output 2. However, if t is actually a prime, i's best response conditional on t is to output 1; similarly, if t is not a prime, i's best response conditional on t is to output 0. The key point is that the machine that outputs i's best response conditional on a type does not do any computation; it just outputs the appropriate value.
Note that here we are strongly using the assumption that i understands the utility of outputting 0 or 1 conditional on type t. This amounts to saying that if he is playing the game conditional on t, then he has enough experience with the game to know whether t is prime. If we wanted to capture a more general setting where the player did not understand the game, even after learning t, then we could do this by considering two types (states) of nature, s 0 and s 1 , where, intuitively, t is composite if the state (nature's type) is s 0 and prime if it is s 1 . Of course, t is either prime or it is not. We can avoid this problem by simply having the utility of outputting 1 in s 0 or 0 in s 1 being −2 (because, intuitively, in state s 0 , t is composite and in s 1 it is prime) and the utility of outputting 0 in s 0 or 1 in s 1 being 2. The relative probability of s 0 and s 1 would reflect the player i's prior probability that t is prime.
In this case, there was no uncertainty about the complexity; there was simply uncertainty about whether the type satisfied a certain property. As we have seen, we can already model the latter type of uncertainty in our framework. To model uncertainty about complexity, we simply allow the complexity function to depend on nature's type, as well as the machine and the input. We leave the straightforward details to the reader.
A common criticism (see e.g., [Aumann 1985 ]) of Nash equilibria that use randomized strategies is that such equilibria cannot be strict (i.e., it cannot be the case that each player's equilibrium strategy gives a strictly better payoff than any other strategy, given the other players' strategies). This follows since any pure strategy in the support of the randomized strategy must give the same payoff as the randomized strategy. As the example below shows, this is no longer the case when considering games with computational costs.
Example 2.5 Consider the same game as in Example 2.4, except that all machines with running time less than or equal to T have a cost of 0, and machines that take time greater than T have a cost of −2. It might very well be the case that, for some values of T , there might be a probabilistic primality testing algorithms that runs in time T and determines with high probability determine whether a given input x is prime or composite, whereas all deterministic algorithms take too much time. (Indeed, although deterministic polynomial-time algorithms for primality testing are known [Agrawal, Keyal, and Saxena 2004] , in practice, randomized algorithms are used because they run significantly faster.)
Sufficient Conditions for the Existence of Nash Equilibrium
Example 2.3 shows, Nash equilibrium does not always exist in machine games. The complexity function in this example charged for randomization. Our goal in this section is to show that this is essentially the reason that Nash equilibrium did not exist; if randomization were free (as it is, for example, in the model of [Ben-Sasson, Kalai, and Kalai 2007] ), then Nash equilibrium would always exist.
This result turns out to be surprisingly subtle. To prove it, we first consider machine games where all computation is free, that is, the utility of a player depends only on the type and action profiles (and not the complexity profiles). Formally, a machine game G = ([m], M, Pr, T, C , u) is computationally cheap if u depends only on the type and action profiles, i.e., if there exists u ′ such that u( t, a, c) = u ′ ( t, a) for all t, a, c.
We would like to show that every computationally cheap Bayesian machine game has a Nash equilibrium. But this is too much to hope for. The first problem is that the game may have infinitely many possible actions, and may not be compact in any reasonable topology. This problem is easily solved; we will simply require that the type space and the set of possible actions be finite. Given a bounding function B : N → N be a function, a B-bounded Turing machine M is one that terminates with probability 1 on each input and, for each x ∈ {0, 1} n , the output of M (x) has length at most B(n). If we restrict our attention to games with a finite type space where only B-bounded machines can be used for some bounding function B, then we are guaranteed to have only finitely many types and actions.
With this restriction, since we do not charge for computation in a computationally cheap game, it may seem that this result should follow trivially from the fact that every finite game has a Nash equilibrium. But this is false. The problem is that the game itself might involve non-computable features, so we cannot hope that that a Turing machine will be able to play a Nash equilibrium, even if it exists.
Recall that a real number r is computable [Turing 1937 ] if there exists a Turing machine that on input n outputs a number r ′ such that |r − r ′ | < 2 −n . A game G = ([m], M, Pr, T, C , u) is computable if (1) for every t ∈ T , Pr[ t] is computable, and (2) for every t, a, c, u( t, a, c) is computable. As we now show, every computationally cheap computable Bayesian machine game has a Nash equilibrium. Even this result is not immediate. Although the game itself is computable, a priori, there may not be a computable Nash equilibrium. Moreover, even if there is, a Turing machine may not be able to simulate it. Our proof deals with both of these problems.
To deal with the first problem, we follow lines similar to those of Lipton and Markakis [2004] , who used the Tarski-Seidenberg transfer principle [Tarski 1951 ] to prove the existence of algebraic Nash equilibria in finite normal norm games with integer valued utilities. We briefly review the relevant details here. Definition 2.6 An ordered field R is a real closed field if every positive element x is a square (i.e., there exists a y ∈ R such that y 2 = x), and every univariate polynomial of odd degree with coefficients in R has a root in R Of course, the real numbers are a real closed field. It is not hard to check that the computable numbers are a real closed field as well.
Theorem 2.1 (Tarski-Seidenberg [Tarski 1951 ]) Let R and R ′ be real closed fields such that R ⊆ R ′ , and letP be a finite set of (multivariate) polynomial inequalities with coefficients in R.
ThenP has a solution in R if and only if it has a solution in R ′ .
With this background, we can state and prove the theorem.
Theorem 2.7 If T is a finite type space, B is a bounding function, M is a set of B-bounded
machines, then G = ([m], M, Pr, C , u) is a
computable, computationally cheap Bayesian machine game, then there exists a Nash equilibrium in G.
Proof: Note that since in G, (1) the type set is finite, (2) the machine set contains only machines with bounded output length, and thus the action set A is finite, and (3) computation is free, there exists a finite (standard) Bayesian game G ′ with the same type space, action space, and utility functions as G. Thus, G ′ has a Nash equilibrium.
Although G ′ has a Nash equilibrium, some equilibria of G ′ might not be implementable by a randomized Turing machine; indeed, Nash [1951] showed that even if all utilities are rational, there exist normal-form games where all Nash equilibria involve mixtures over actions with irrational probabilities. To deal with this problem we use the transfer principle.
Let R ′ be the real numbers and R be the computable numbers. Clearly R ⊂ R ′ . We use the approach of Lipton and Markakis to show that a Nash equilibrium in G ′ must be the solution to a set of polynomial inequalities with coefficients in R (i.e., with computable coefficients). Then, by combining the Tarski-Seidenberg transfer principle with the fact that G ′ has a Nash equilibrium, it follows that there is a computable Nash equilibrium.
The polynomial equations characterizing the Nash equilibria of G ′ are easy to characterize. By definition, σ is a Nash equilibrium of G ′ if and only if (1) for each player i, each type t i ∈ T i , and (2) for each player i and t i , a i ∈A i σ(t i , a i ) = 1, and (3) for each player i t i ∈ T , and action a ′ i ∈ A,
Here we are using the fact that a Nash equilibrium must continue to be a Nash equilibrium conditional on each type. Let P be the set of polynomial equations that result by replacing σ j (t j , a j ) by the variable x j,t j ,a j . Since both the type set and action set is finite, and since both the type distribution and utilities are computable, this is a finite set of polynomial inequalities with computable coefficients, whose solutions are the Nash equilibria of G ′ . It now follows from the transfer theorem that G ′ has a Nash equilibrium where all the probabilities σ i (t i , a i ) are computable.
It remains only to show that this equilibrium can be implemented by a randomized Turing machine. We show that, for each player i, and each type t i , there exists a randomized machine that samples according to the distribution σ i (t i ); since the type set is finite, this implies that there exists a machine that implements the strategy σ i .
Let a 1 , . . . , a N denote the actions for player i, and let 0 = s 0 ≤ s 1 ≤ . . . ≤ s N = 1 be a sequence of numbers such that σ i (t i , a j ) = s j − s j−1 . Note that since σ is computable, each number s j is computable too. That means that there exists a machine that, on input n, computes an approximations n j to s j , such thats n j − 2 −n ≤ s j ≤s n j + 2 −n . Consider now the machine M t i i that proceeds as follows. The machine constructs a binary decimal .r 1 r 2 r 3 . . . bit by bit. After the nth step of the construction, the machine checks if the decimal constructed thus far (.r 1 . . . r n ) is guaranteed to be a unique interval (s k , s k+1 ]. (Since s 0 , . . . , s N are computable, it can do this by approximating each one to within 2 −n .) With probability 1, after a finite number of steps, the decimal expansion will be known to lie in a unique interval (s k , s k+1 ]. When this happens, action a k is performed.
We now want to prove that a Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to exist provided that randomization is free. Thus, we assume that we start with a finite set M 0 of deterministic Turing machines and a finite set T of types (and continue to assume that all the machines in M 0 terminate). M is the computable convex closure of M 0 if M consists of machines M that, on input (t, r), first perform some computation that depends only on the random string r and not on the type t, that with probability 1, after some finite time and after reading a finite prefix r 1 of r, choose a machine M ′ ∈ M 0 , then run M ′ on input (t, r 2 ), where r 2 is the remaining part of the random tape r. Intuitively, M is randomizing over the machines in M 0 . It is easy to see that there must be some B such that all the machines in M are B-bounded. Randomization is free in a machine
2 ) (using the notation from above). Proof Sketch: First consider the normal-form game where the agents choose a machine in M 0 , and the payoff of player i if M is chosen is the expected payoff in G (where the expectation is taken with respect to the probability Pr on T ). By Nash's theorem, it follows that there exists a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in this game. Using the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 2.7, it follows that there exists a machine in M that samples according to the mixed distribution over machines, as long as the game is computable (i.e., the type distribution and utilities are computable) and the type and action spaces finite. (The fact that the action space is finite again follows from the fact that type space is finite and that there exist some B such that all machine in M are B-bounded.) The desired result follows.
We remark that if we take Aumann's [1987] view of a mixed-strategy equilibrium as representing an equilibrium in players' beliefs-that is, each player is actually using a deterministic strategy in M 0 , and the probability that player i plays a strategy M ′ ∈ M 0 in equilibrium represents all the other players' beliefs about the probability that M ′ will be played-then we can justify randomization being free, since players are not actually randomizing. The fact that the randomization is computable here amounts to the assumption that players' beliefs are computable (a requirement advocated by Megiddo [1989] ) and that the population players are chosen from can be sampled by a Turing machine. More generally, there may be settings where randomization devices are essentially freely available (although, even then, it may not be so easy to create an arbitrary computable distribution).
Theorem 2.8 shows that if randomization is free, a Nash equilibrium in machine games is guaranteed to exist. We can generalize this argument to show that, to guarantee the existence of ǫ-Nash equilibrium (for arbitrarily small ǫ) it is enough to assume that "polynomial-time" randomization is free. Lipton, Markakis and Mehta [2003] show that every finite game with action space A has an ǫ-Nash equilibrium with support on only poly(log |A| + 1/ǫ) actions; furthermore the probability of each action is a rational number of length poly(log |A| + 1/ǫ). In our setting, it follows that there exists an ǫ-Nash equilibrium where the randomization can be computed by a Turing machine with size and running-time bounded by size O(log |M ′ | + 1/ǫ). We omit the details here.
Computationally Robust Nash Equilibrium
Computers get faster, cheaper, and more powerful every year. Since utility in a Bayesian machine game takes computational complexity into account, this suggests that an agent's utility function will change when he replaces one computer by a newer computer. We are thus interested in robust equilibria, intuitively, ones that continue to be equilibria (or, more precisely, ǫ-equilibria for some appropriate ǫ) even if agents' utilities change as a result of upgrading computers. 
e., G ′ and G ′ differ only in their complexity and machine profiles), and C
We also say that M i is a p-robust ǫ-best response to M −i in G, if for every gameG that is at most a p-speedup of G, M i is an ǫ-best response to M −i . Note that M is a p-robust ǫ-equilibrium iff, for i = 1, . . . , m, M i is a p-robust ǫ-best response to M −i . Intuitively, if we think of complexity as denoting running time and C describes the running time of machines (i.e., programs) on an older computer, then C ′ describes the running time of machines on an upgraded computer. For instance, if the upgraded computer runs at most twice as fast as the older one (but never slower), then C ′ is2 speedup of C , wherek denotes the constant function k. Clearly, if M is a Nash equilibrium of G, then it is a1-robust equilibrium. We can think of p-robust equilibrium as a refinement of Nash equilibrium for machine games, just like sequential equilibrium or perfect equilibrium [Selten 1975 ]; it provides a principled way of ignoring "bad" Nash equilibria.
Note that in games where computation is free, every Nash equilibrium is also computationally robust.
Coalition Machine Games
We strengthen the notion of Nash equilibrium to allow for deviating coalitions. Towards this goal, we consider a generalization of Bayesian machine games called coalition machine games, where, in the spirit of coalitional games [Neumann and Morgenstern 1947] , each subset of players has a complexity function and utility function associated with it. In analogy with the traditional notion of Nash equilibrium, which considers only "single-player" deviations, we consider only "singlecoalition" deviations.
More precisely, given a subset Z of [m], we let −Z denote the set [m]/Z. We say that a machine M ′ Z controls the players in Z if M ′ Z controls the input and output tapes of the players in set Z (and thus can coordinate their outputs). In addition, the adversary that controls Z has its own input and output tape. A coalition machine game G is described by a tuple ([m] , M, Pr, C , u), where C and u are sequences of complexity functions C Z and utility functions u Z , respectively, one for each subset Z of [m]; m, M, Pr, C Z are defined as in Definition 2.1. In contrast, the utility function u Z for the set Z is a function
) is the utility of the coalition Z if t is the (length m + 1) type profile, a is the (length m) action profile (where we identify i's action as player i output), c Z is the complexity of the coalition Z, and c −Z is the (length m − |Z|) profile of machine complexities for the players in −Z. The complexity c Z is a measure of the complexity according to whoever controls coalition Z of running the coalition. Note that even if the coalition is controlled by a machine M ′ Z that lets each of the players in Z perform independent computations, the complexity of M ′ Z is not necessarily some function of the complexities c i of the players i ∈ Z (such as the sum or the max). Moreover, while cooperative game theory tends to focus on superadditive utility functions, where the utility of a coalition is at least the sum of the utilities of any partition of the coalition into sub-coalitions or individual players, we make no such restrictions; indeed when taking complexity into account, it might very well be the case that larger coalitions are more expensive than smaller ones. Also note that, in our calculations, we assume that, other than the coalition Z, all the other players play individually (so that we use c i for i / ∈ Z); there is at most one coalition in the picture. Having defined u Z , we can define the expected utility of the group Z in the obvious way.
The benign machine for coalition Z, denoted M b Z , is the one where that gives each player i ∈ Z its true input, and each player i ∈ Z outputs the output of M i ; M b Z write nothing on its output tape. Essentially, the benign machine does exactly what all the players in the coalition would have done anyway. We now extend the notion of Nash equilibrium to deal with coalitions; it requires that in an equilibrium M , no coalition does (much) better than it would using the benign machine, according to the utility function for that coalition. 
Our notion of coalition games is quite general. In particular, if we disregard the costs of computation, it allows us to capture some standard notions of coalition resistance in the literature, by choosing u Z appropriately. For example, Aumann's [1959] notion of strong equilibrium requires that, for all coalitions, it is not the case that there is a deviation that makes everyone in the coalition strictly better off. To capture this, fix a profile M , and define
We can capture the notion of k-resilient equilibrium [Abraham, Dolev, Gonen, and H Abraham, Dolev, and Halpern 2008] , where the only deviations allowed are by coalitions of size at most k, by restricting Z to consist of sets of cardinality at most k (so a 1-resilient equilibrium is just a Nash equilibrium). Abraham et al. [2006 Abraham et al. [ , 2008 also consider a notion of strong k-resilient equilibrium, where there is no deviation by the coalition that makes even one coalition member strictly better off. We can capture this by replacing the min in the definition of u M Z by max.
6 Note that if we do not disregard the cost of computation, it is not clear how to define the individual complexity of a player that is controlled by M ′ Z .
Machine Games with Mediators
Up to now we have assumed that the only input a machine receives is the initial type. This is appropriate in a normal-form game, but does not allow us to consider game where players can communicate with each other and (possibly) with a trusted mediator.
We now extend Bayesian machine games to allow for communication. For ease of exposition, we assume that all communication passes between the players and a trusted mediator. Communication between the players is modeled by having a trusted mediator who passes along messages received from the players. Thus, we think of the players as having reliable communication channels to and from a mediator; no other communication channels are assumed to exist.
The formal definition of a Bayesian machine game with a mediator is similar in spirit to that of a Bayesian machine game, but now we assume that the machines are interactive Turing machines, that can also send and receive messages. We omit the formal definition of an interactive Turing machine (see, for example, [Goldreich 2001]) ; roughly speaking, the machines use a special tape where the message to be sent is placed and another tape where a message to be received is written. The mediator is modeled by an interactive Turing machine that we denote F. A Bayesian machine game with a mediator (or a mediated Bayesian machine game) is thus a pair (G, F), where G = ([m], M, Pr, C 1 , . . . , C n , u 1 , . . . , u n ) is a Bayesian machine game (except that M here denotes a set of interactive machines) and F is an interactive Turing machine.
Like machines in Bayesian machine games, interactive machines in a game with a mediator take as argument a view and produce an outcome. Since what an interactive machine does can depend on the history of messages sent by the mediator, the message history (or, more precisely, that part of the message history actually read by the machine) is also part of the view. Thus, we now define a view to be a string t; h; r in {0, 1} * ; {0, 1} * ; {0, 1} * , where, as before, t is that part of the type actually read and r is a finite bitstring representing the string of random bits actually used, and h is a finite sequence of messages received and read. Again, if v = t; h; r, we take M (v) to be the output of M given the view.
We assume that the system proceeds in synchronous stages; a message sent by one machine to another in stage k is received by the start of stage k+1. More formally, following [Abraham, Dolev, Gonen , and Halper we assume that a stage consists of three phases. In the first phase of a stage, each player i sends a message to the mediator, or, more precisely, player i's machine M i computes a message to send to the mediator; machine M i can also send an empty message, denoted λ. In the second phase, the mediator receives the message and mediator's machine sends each player i a message in response (again, the mediator can send an empty message). In the third phase, each player i performs an action other than that of sending a message (again, it may do nothing). The messages sent and the actions taken can depend on the machine's message history (as well as its initial type).
We can now define the expected utility of a profile of interactive machines in a Bayesian machine game with a mediator. The definition is similar in spirit to the definition in Bayesian machine games, except that we must take into account the dependence of a player's actions on the message sent by the mediator. Let view i ( M , F, t, r) denote the string (t i ; h i ; r i ) where h i denotes the messages received by player i if the machine profile is M , the mediator uses machine F, the type profile is t, and r is the profile of random strings used by the players and the mediator. Given a mediated Bayesian machine game G ′ = (G, F), we can define the random variable u
( t, r) as before, except that now r must include a random string for the mediator, and to compute the outcome and the complexity function, M j gets as an argument view j ( M , F, t, r), since this is the view that machine M j gets in this setting. Finally, we define
] as before, except that now Pr + is a distribution on T × ({0, 1} ∞ ) n+1 rather than T × ({0, 1} ∞ ) n , since we must include a random string for the mediator as well as the players' machines. We can define Nash equilibrium and computationally robust Nash equilibrium in games with mediators as in Bayesian machine games; we leave the details to the reader.
Up to now, we have considered only players communicating with a mediator. We certainly want to allow for the possibility of players communicating with each other. We model this using a particular mediator that we call the communication mediator, denoted comm, which corresponds to what cryptographers call secure channels and economists call cheap talk. With this mediator, if i wants to send a message to j, it simply sends the message and its intended recipient to the mediator comm. The mediator's strategy is simply to forward the messages, and the identities of the senders, to the intended recipients. (Technically, we assume that a message m from i to the mediator with intended recipient j has the form m; j. Messages not of this form are ignored by the mediator.)
Repeated and extensive games We can extend the above treatment to consider repeated games (where information from earlier plays is relevant to later plays), and, more generally, arbitrary extensive-form games (i.e., games defined by game trees). We capture an extensive-form game by simply viewing nature as a mediator; we allow utility functions to take into account the messages sent by the player to the mediator (i.e., talk is not necessarily "cheap"), and also the random coins used by the mediator. In other words, we assume, without loss of generality, that all communication and signals sent to a player are sent through the mediator, and that all actions taken by a player are sent as messages to the mediator. We leave the details of the formal definition to the reader.
As shown by the example below, Nash equilibrium in machine games gives a plausible explanation of observed behavior in the finitely-repeated prisoner's dilemma.
Example 2.11 Recall that in the prisoner's dilemma, there are two prisoners, who can choose to either cooperate or defect. As described in the table below, if they both cooperate, they both get 3; if they both defect, then both get -3; if one defects and the other cooperates, the defector gets 5 and the cooperator gets −5. (Intuitively, the cooperator stays silent, while the defector "rats out" his partner. If they both rat each other out, they both go to jail.)
It is easy to see that defecting dominates cooperating: no matter what the other player does, a player is better off defecting than cooperating. Thus, "rational" players should defect. And, indeed, (D, D) is the only Nash equilibrium of this game. Although (C, C) gives both players a better payoff than (D, D), this is not an equilibrium. Now consider finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma (FRPD), where prisoner's dilemma is played for some fixed number N of rounds. The only Nash equilibrium is to always defect; this can be seen by a backwards induction argument. (The last round is like the one-shot game, so both players should defect; given that they are both defecting at the last round, they should both defect at the second-last round; and so on.) This seems quite unreasonable. And, indeed, in experiments, people do not always defect [Axelrod 1984] . In fact, quite often they cooperate throughout the game. Are they irrational? It is hard to call this irrational behavior, given that the "irrational" players do much better than supposedly rational players who always defect.
There have been many attempts to explain cooperation in FRPD in the literature; see, for example, [Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, and Wilson 1982; Neyman 1985; Papadimitriou and Yannakakis 1994] . In particular, [Neyman 1985; Papadimitriou and Yannakakis 1994] demonstrate that if players are restricted to using a finite automaton with bounded complexity, then there exist equilibria that allow for cooperation. However, the strategies used in those equilibria are quite complex, and require the use of large automata; 7 as a consequence this approach does not seem to provide a satisfactory explanation as to why people choose to cooperate.
By using our framework, we can provide a straightforward explanation. Consider the tit-for-tat strategy, which proceeds as follows: a player cooperates at the first round, and then at round m + 1, does whatever his opponent did at round m. Thus, if the opponent cooperated at the previous round, then you reward him by continuing to cooperate; if he defected at the previous round, you punish him by defecting. If both players play tit-for-tat, then they cooperate throughout the game. Interestingly, tit-for-tat does exceedingly well in FRPD tournaments, where computer programs play each other [Axelrod 1984 ].
Now consider a machine-game version of FRPD, where at each round the player receive as signal the move of the opponent in the previous rounds before they choose their action. In such a game, tit-for-tat is a simple program, which needs no memory (i.e., the machine is stateless). Suppose that we charge even a modest amount α for memory usage (i.e., stateful machines get a penalty of at least α, whereas stateless machines get no penalty), that there is a discount factor δ, with 0.5 < δ < 1, so that if the player gets a reward of r m in round m, his total reward over the whole N -round game (excluding the complexity penalty) is taken to be N m=1 δ m r m , that α ≥ 2δ N , and that N > 2. In this case, it will be a Nash equilibrium for both players to play tit-for-tat. Intuitively, no matter what the cost of memory is (as long as it is positive), for a sufficiently long game, tit-for-tat is a Nash equilibrium.
To see this, note that the best response to tit-for-tat is to play tit-for-tat up to but not including the last round, and then to defect. But following this strategy requires the player to keep track of the round number, which requires the use of extra memory. The extra gain of 2 achieved by defecting at the last round will not be worth the cost of keeping track of the round number as long as α ≥ 2δ N ; thus no stateful strategy can do better. It remains to argue that no stateless strategy (even a randomized stateless strategy) can do better against tit-for-tat. Note that any strategy that defects for the first time at round k < N does at least 6δ k+1 − 2δ k worse than tit-for-tat. It gains 2 at round k (for a discounted utility of 2δ k ), but loses at least 6 relative to tit-for-tat in the next round, for a discounted utility of 6δ k+1 . From that point on the best response is to either continue defecting (which at each round leads to a loss of 6), or cooperating until the last round and then defecting (which leads to an additional loss of 2 in round k + 1, but a gain of 2 in round N ). Thus, any strategy that defects at round k < N does at least 6δ k+1 − 2δ k worse than tit-for-tat.
A strategy that defects at the last round gains 2δ N relative to tit-for-tat. Since N > 2, the probability that a stateless strategy defects at round N − 1 or earlier is at least as high as the probability that it defects for the first time at round N . (We require that N > 2 to make sure that there exist some round k < N where the strategy is run on input C.) It follows that any stateless strategy that defects for the first time in the last round with probability p in expectation gains at most p(2δ N − (6δ N − 2δ N −1 )) = pδ N −1 (2 − 4δ), which is negative when δ > 0.5. Thus, when α ≥ 2δ N , N > 2, and δ > 0.5, tit-for-tat is a Nash equilibrium in FRPD. (However, also note that depending on the cost of memory, tit-for-tat may not be a Nash equilibrium for sufficiently short games.)
The argument above can be extended to show that tit-for-tat is a Nash equilibrium even if there is also a charge for randomness or computation, as long as there is no computational charge for machines as "simple" as tit-for-tat; this follows since adding such extra charges can only make things worse for strategies other than tit-for-tat. Also note that even if only one player is charged for memory, and memory is free for the other player, then there is a Nash equilibrium where the bounded player plays tit-for-tat, while the other player plays the best response of cooperating up to but not including the last round of the game, and then defecting.
The revelation principle The revelation principle is one of the fundamental principles in traditional implementation theory. A specific instance of it [Myerson 1979; Forges 1986] stipulates that for every Nash equilibrium in a mediated games (G, F), there exists a different mediator F ′ such that it is a Nash equilibrium for the players to truthfully report their type to the mediator and then perform the action suggested by the mediator. As we demonstrate, this principle no longer holds when we take computation into account (a similar point is made by Conitzer and Sandholm [2004] , although they do not use our formal model). The intuition is simple: truthfully reporting your type will not be an equilibrium if it is too "expensive" to send the whole type to the mediator. For a naive counter example, consider a game where a player get utility 1 whenever its complexity is 0 (i.e., the player uses the strategy ⊥) and positive utility otherwise. Clearly, in this game it can never be an equilibrium to truthfully report your type to any mediator. This example is degenerate as the players actually never use the mediator. In the following example, we consider a game with a Nash equilibrium where the players use the mediator.
Consider a 2-player game where each player's type is an n-bit number. The type space consists of all pairs of n-bit numbers that either are the same, or that differ in all but at most k places, where k ≪ n. The player receive a utility of 1 if they can guess correctly whether their types are the same or not, while having communicated less than k + 2 bits; otherwise it receives a utility of 0. Consider a mediator that upon receiving k + 1 bits from the players answers back to both players whether the bits received are identical or not. With such a mediator it is an equilibrium for the players to provide the first k + 1 bits of their input and then output whatever the mediator tells them. However, providing the full type is always too expensive (and can thus never be a Nash equilibrium), no matter what mediator the players have access to.
A Computational Notion of Game-Theoretic Implementation
In this section we extend the traditional notion of game-theoretic implementation of mediators to consider computational games. Our aim is to obtain a notion of implementation that can be used to capture the cryptographic notion of implementation. For simplicity, we focus on implementations of mediators that receive a single message from each player and return a single message to each player (i.e., the mediated games consist only of a single stage).
We provide a definition that captures the intuition that the machine profile M implements a mediator F if, whenever a set of players want to to truthfully provide their "input" to the mediator F, they also want to run M using the same inputs. To formalize "whenever", we consider what we call canonical coalition games, where each player i has a type t i of the form x i ; z i , where x i is player i's intended "input" and z i consists of some additional information that player i has about the state of the world. We assume that the input x i has some fixed length n. Such games are called canonical games of input length n. 8 Let Λ F denote the machine that, given type t = x; z sends x to the mediator F and outputs as its action whatever string it receives back from F, and then halts. (Technically, we model the fact that Λ F is expecting to communicate with F by assuming that the mediator F appends a signature to its messages, and any messages not signed by F are ignored by Λ F .) Thus, the machine Λ F ignores the extra information z. Let Λ F denote the machine profile where each player uses the machine Λ F . Roughly speaking, to capture the fact that whenever the players want to compute F, they also want to run M ), we require that if Λ F is an equilibrium in the game (G, F) (i.e., if it is an equilibrium to simply provide the intended input to F and finally output whatever F replies), running M using the intended input is an equilibrium as well.
We actually consider a more general notion of implementation: we are interested in understanding how well equilibrium in a set of games with mediator F can be implemented using a machine profile M and a possibly different mediator F ′ . Roughly speaking, we want that, for every game G in some set G of games, if Λ F is an equilibrium in (G, F), then M is an equilibrium in (G, F ′ ). In particular, we want to understand what degree of robustness p in the game (G, F) is required to achieve an ǫ-equilibrium in the game (G, F ′ ). We also require that the equilibrium with mediator F ′ be as "coalition-safe" as the equilibrium with mediator F. 
(Preserving Action Distributions) For each type profile t, the action profile induced by Λ F in (G, F) is identically distributed to the action profile induced by
Note that, depending on the class G, our notion of universal implementation imposes severe restrictions on the complexity of the machine profile M . For instance, if G consists of all games, it requires that the complexity of M is the same as the complexity of Λ F . (If the complexity of M is higher than that of Λ F , then we can easily construct a game G by choosing the utilities appropriately such that it is an equilibrium to run Λ F in (G, F), but running M is too costly.) Also note that if G consists of games where players strictly prefer smaller complexity, then universal implementation requires that M be the optimal algorithm (i.e., the algorithm with the lowest complexity) that implements the functionality of M , since otherwise a player would prefer to switch to the optimal implementation. Since few algorithms algorithms have been shown to be provably optimal with respect to, for example, the number of computational steps of a Turing machines, this, at first sight, seems to severely limit the use of our definition. However, if we consider games with "coarse" complexity functions, or a complexity functions where, say, the first T steps are "free" (e.g., machines that execute less than T steps are assigned complexity 1), the restrictions above are not so severe. Indeed, it seems quite natural to assume that a player is indifferent between the "small" differences in computation.
Our notion of universal implementation is related to a number of other notions in the literature; we briefly review the most relevant ones here.
• Our definition of universal implementation captures intuitions similar in spirit to Forges ' [1990] notion of a universal mechanism. It differs in one obvious way: our definition considers computational games, where the utility functions depend on complexity considerations. As mentioned, Dodis, Halevi and Rabin [2000] (and more recent work, such as [Abraham, Dolev, Gonen, and Halpern 2006; Lepinski, Micali, Peikert, and Shelat 2004; Halpern and Teagu Abraham, Dolev, Gonen, and Halpern 2006; Gordon and Katz 2006; Kol and Naor 2008] ) consider notions of implementation where the players are modeled as polynomially-bounded Turing machines, but do not consider computational games. As such, the notions considered in these works do not provide any a-priori guarantees about the incentives of players with regard to computation.
• Recently, Izmalkov, Lepinski and Micali [2008] introduced a strong notion of implementation, called perfect implementation. Although their notion does not explicitly consider games with computational costs, their notion can be viewed as a strengthening of ours under certain assumptions about the cost of computation; however, their notion can be achieved only with the use of strong primitives that cannot be implemented under standard computational and systems assumptions [Lepinki, Micali, and Shelat 2005] .
• Our definition is more general than earlier notions of implementation in that we consider also universality with respect to (sub-)classes of games G. This extra generality will be extensively used in the sequel.
• Our notion of coalition-safety also differs somewhat from earlier notions. Note that if Z contains all subsets of players with k or less players, then universal implementation implies that all k-resilient Nash equilibria and all strong k-resilient Nash equilibria are preserved. However, unlike the notion of k-resilience considered by Abraham et al. [2006 Abraham et al. [ , 2008 , our notion provides a "best-possible" guarantee for games that do not have a k-resilient Nash equilibrium. We guarantee that if a certain subset Z of players have no incentive to deviate in the mediated game, then that subset will not have incentive to deviate in the cheaptalk game; this is similar in spirit to the definitions of [Izmalkov, Lepinski, and Micali 2008; Lepinski, Micali, Peikert, and Shelat 2004] . Note that, in contrast to [Izmalkov, Lepinski, and Micali 2008; Lepinki, Micali, and Shelat 2005] , rather than just allowing colluding players to communicate only through their moves in the game, we allow coalitions of players that are controlled by a single entity; this is equivalent to considering collusions where the colluding players are allowed to freely communicate with each other. In other words, whereas the definitions of [Izmalkov, Lepinski, and Micali 2008; Lepinki, Micali, and Shelat 2005] require protocols to be "signalling-free", our definition does not impose such restrictions. We believe that this model is better suited to capturing the security of cryptographic protocols in most traditional settings (where signalling is not an issue).
• We require only that a Nash equilibrium is preserved when moving from the game with mediator F to the communication game. Stronger notions of implementation require that the equilibrium in the communication game be a sequential equilibrium ; see, for example, [Gerardi 2004; Ben-Porath 2003] . Since every Nash equilibrium in the game with the mediator F is also a sequential equilibrium, these stronger notions of implementation actually show that sequential equilibrium is preserved when passing from the game with the mediator to the communication game.
While these notions of implementation guarantee that an equilibrium with the mediator is preserved in the communication game, they do not guarantee that new equilibria are not introduced in the latter. An even stronger guarantee is provided by Izmalkov, Lepinski and Micali's [2008] notion of perfect implementation; this notion requires a one-to-one correspondence f between strategies in the corresponding games such that each player's utility with strategy profile σ in the game with the mediator is the same as his utility with strategy profile (f (σ 1 ), . . . , f (σ n )) in the communication game without the mediator. Such a correspondence, called strategic equivalence by Izmalkov, Lepinski, and Micali [2008] , guarantees (among other things) that all types of equilibria are preserved when passing from one game to the other, and that no new equilibria are introduced in the communication game. We focus on the sim-pler notion of implementation, which requires only that Nash equilibria are preserved, and leave open an exploration of more refined notions.
Strong Universal Implementation Intuitively, ( M , F ′ ) universally implements F if, whenever a set of parties want to compute F, then they also want to run M (using F ′ ), where we take "wanting to compute F (resp., run M )" to be "it is an equilibrium to use Λ F when playing with the mediator F (resp., to use M when playing with the mediator F ′ )". We now strengthen this notion to also require that whenever a subset of the players do not want to compute F (i.e., if they prefer to do "nothing"), then they also do not want to run M , even if all other players do so. Recall that ⊥ denotes the (canonical) machine that does nothing. Recall that if adversary Z uses ⊥, then it sends no messages and writes nothing on all the output tapes of players in Z.
Relating Cryptographic and Game-Theoretic Implementation
We briefly recall the notion of precise secure computation [Micali and Pass 2006; Micali and Pass 2007; Goldreich, Micali, and Wigderson 1986] ; more details are given in Appendix A. An m-ary functionality is specified by a random process that maps vectors of inputs to vectors of outputs (one input and one output for each player). That is, formally, f = ∪ ∞ n=1 f n , where f n : (({0, 1} n ) m ×{0, 1} ∞ ) → ({0, 1} n ) m and f n (f n 1 , ..., f n m ). We often abuse notation and suppress the random bitstring r, writing f n ( x) or f ( x). (We can think of f n ( x) and f n i ( x) as random variables.) A machine profile M computes f if for all n ∈ N , all inputs x ∈ ({0, 1} n ) m the output vector of the players after an execution of M on input x (where M i gets input x i ) is identically distributed to f n ( x).
As usual, the security of a protocol M for computing a function f is defined by comparing the real execution of M with an ideal execution where all players directly talk to a trusted third party (i.e., a mediator) computing f . Roughly speaking, a machine profile M securely computes an m-ary functionality f if the real execution of M emulates the ideal execution. This is formalized by requiring that for every real-execution adversary A, there exists an ideal-execution adversaryÃ, called the simulator, such that the real execution of M with A is emulated by the ideal execution withÃ. The job ofÃ is to provide appropriate inputs to the trusted party, and to reconstruct the view of A in the real execution. This should be done is such a way that no distinguisher D can distinguish the outputs of the parties, and the view of the adversary, in the real and the ideal execution. (Note that in the real execution, the view of the adversary is simply the actual view of A in the execution, whereas in the ideal execution we refer to the reconstructed view output byÃ).
The traditional notion of secure computation [Goldreich, Micali, and Wigderson 1987] requires only that the worst-case complexity (size and running-time) ofÃ is polynomially related to that of A. Precise secure computation [Micali and Pass 2006; Micali and Pass 2007] additionally requires that the running time of the simulatorÃ "respects" the running time of the adversary A in an "execution-by-execution" fashion: a secure computation is said to have precision p(n, t) if the running-time of the simulatorÃ (on input security parameter n) is bounded by p(n, t) wheneverÃ outputs a view in which the running-time of A is t.
In this work we introduce a weakening of the notion of precise secure computation. The formal definition is given in Appendix A.1. We here highlight some key differences:
• The standard definition requires the existence of a simulator for every A, such the real and the ideal execution cannot be distinguished given any set of inputs and any distinguisher. In analogy with the work of Dwork, Naor, Reingold, and Stockmeyer [2003], we change the order of the quantifiers. We simply require that given any adversary, any input distribution and any distinguisher, there exists a simulator that tricks that particular distinguisher, except with probability ǫ(n); ǫ is called the error of the secure computation.
• The notion of precise simulation requires that the simulator never exceeds its precision bounds. We here relax this assumption and let the simulator exceed its bound with probability ǫ(n).
Additionally, we generalize this notion to consider arbitrary complexity measures C (instead of just running-time), and to consider general adversary structures [Hirt and Maurer 2000] (where the specification of a secure computation includes a set Z of subsets of players such that the adversary is allowed to corrupt only the players in one of the subsets in Z; in contrast, in [Goldreich, Micali, and Wigderson 1987; Micali and Pass 2006] only threshold adversaries are considered, where Z consists of all subsets up to a pre-specified size k.)
We will be most interested in secure computation protocols with precision p where p(n, 0) = 0; such functions are called homogeneous. In our setting (where only the machine ⊥ has complexity 0), this property essentially says that the adversary running ⊥ in the ideal execution (i.e., abortingnot sending any messages to the trusted third party and writing nothing on all the output tapes of players in Z) must be a valid simulator of the adversary running ⊥ in the real execution. 9 Note that the we can always regain the "non-precise" notion of secure computation by instantiating C (M, v) with the sum of the worst-case running-time of M (on inputs of the same length as the input length in v) and size of M . Thus, by the classical results of [Ben-Or, Goldwasser, and Wigderson 1988; Goldwasser, Micali, and Rackoff 1989; Goldreich, Micali, and Wigderson 1987] it directly follows that there exists weak C -precise secure computation protocols with precision p(n, t) = poly(n, t) (where p is homogeneous) when C (M, v) is the sum of the worst-case running-time of M and size of M . The results of [Micali and Pass 2006; Micali and Pass 2007] extend to show the existence of weak C -precise secure computation protocols with precision p(n, t) = O(t) (where p is homogeneous) when C (M, v) is a linear combination of the running-time (as opposed to just worst-case running-time) of M (v) and size of M . See Appendix C for more details.
Equivalences
As a warm-up, we show that "error-free" secure computation, also known as perfectly-secure computation [Ben-Or, Goldwasser, and Wigderson 1988] , already implies the traditional game-theoretic notion of implementation [Forges 1990 ] (which does not consider computation). To do this, we first formalize the traditional game-theoretic notion using our notation: Let M be an m-player profile of machines. We say that ( M , F ′ ) is a traditional game-theoretic implementation of F if ( M , F ′ ) is a (G nocomp , {{1}, . . . {m}}, 0)-universal implementation of F with 0-error, where G nocomp denotes the class of all m-player canonical machine games where the utility functions do not depend on the complexity profile. (Recall that the traditional notion does not consider computational games or coalition games.)
We say that a mediator F computes the m-ary functionality f if for all n ∈ N and all inputs x ∈ ({0, 1} n ) m , the output vector of the players after an execution of Λ on input x and with the mediator F is distributed identically to f ( x).
Proposition 4.1 Suppose that f is an m-ary functionality, F is a mediator that computes f , and M is a machine profile. Then ( M , comm) is a traditional game-theoretic implementation of F if M is a (traditional) perfectly-secure computation of F.
Proof: We start by showing that running M is a Nash equilibrium if running Λ F with mediator F is one. Recall that the cryptographic notion of error-free secure computation requires that for every player i and every "adversarial" machine M ′ i controlling player i, there exists a "simulator" machinẽ M i , such that the outputs of all players in the execution of (M ′ i , M −i ) are identically distributed to the output of the players in the execution of (M i , Λ F −i ) with mediator F. 10 In game-theoretic terms, this means that every "deviating" strategy M ′ i in the communication game can be mapped into a deviating strategyM i in the mediated game with the same output distribution for each type, and, hence, the same utility, since the utility depends only on the type and the output distribution; this follows since we require universality only with respect to games in G nocomp . Since no deviations in the mediated game can give higher utility than the Nash equilibrium strategy of using Λ F i , running M must also be a Nash equilibrium.
It only remains to show that M and Λ F induce the same action distribution; this follows directly from the definition of secure computation by considering an adversary that does not corrupt any parties.
We now relate our computational notion of implementation to precise secure computation. Our goal is to show that weak precise secure computation is equivalent to strong G-universal implementation for certain natural classes G of games. We consider games that satisfy a number of natural restrictions. If G = ([m], M, Pr, C , u) is a canonical game with input length n, then 1. G is machine universal if the machine set M is the set of Turing machines. 
Let G C denote the class of machine-universal, normalized, monotone, canonical C -games. Up to now we have placed no constraints on the complexity function. We do need some minimal constraints for our theorem. For one direction of our equivalence results (showing that precise secure computation implies universal implementation), we require that honestly running the protocol should have constant complexity, and that it be the same with and without a mediator. More precisely, we say that a complexity function C is M -acceptable if, for every subset Z, the machines (Λ F ) b Z and M b Z have the same complexity c 0 for all inputs; that is,
Note that an assumption of this nature is necessary in order to show that ( M , comm) is a (G C , Z, p)-universal implementation of F. As mentioned earlier, if the complexity of M is higher than that of Λ F , then we can construct a game G such that it is an equilibrium to run Λ F in (G, F), but running M is too costly. The assumption that M and Λ F have the same complexity is easily satisfied when considering coarse complexity function (where say the first T steps of computation are free). Another way of satisfying this assumption is to consider a complexity function that simply charges c 0 for the use of the mediator, where c 0 is the complexity of running the protocol. Given this view, universal implementation requires only that players want 10 The follows from the fact that perfectly-secure computation is error-free. 11 Our results continue to hold if c0 is a function on the input length n but otherwise does not depend on the view.
to run M as long as they are willing to pay c 0 in complexity for talking to the mediator. (We remark that we can weaken the assumption that M and Λ F have exactly the same complexity, and allow them to have approximately equal complexities, by considering universality with respect to a slightly more restricted class of games. We omit the details.)
For the other direction of our equivalence (showing that universal implementation implies precise secure computation), we require that certain operations, like moving output from one tape to another, do not incur any additional complexity. Such complexity functions are called outputinvariant; we provide a formal definition at the beginning of Section B. We can now state the connection between secure computation and game-theoretic implementation. In Appendix C we provide a "computational" analogue of the equivalence theorem above: roughly speaking, we show an equivalence between computational precise secure computation and strong universal implementation with respect to "computationally-efficient" classes of games (i.e., games where the complexity and utility functions can be computed by polynomial-size circuits, and where we consider only machines whose computations can be carried out by polynomial-size circuits). As a corollary of this result, we also obtain a game-theoretic characterization of the "standard" (i.e., "non-precise") notion of secure computation; roughly speaking, we show an equivalence between secure computation and strong universal implementation with respect to computationallyefficient classes of games when considering a complexity function C (M, v) that is a combination of the worst-case running-time of M and the size of M .
Proof overview
We now provide a high-level overview of the proof of Theorem 4.2. Needless to say, this oversimplified sketch leaves out many crucial details which complicate the proof.
Weak precise secure computation implies strong universal implementation. At first glance, it might seem like the traditional notion of secure computation of [Goldreich, Micali, and Wigderson 1987] easily implies the notion of universal implementation: if there exists some (deviating) strategy A in the communication game implementing mediator F that results in a different distribution over actions than in equilibrium, then the simulatorÃ for A could be used to obtain the same distribution; moreover, the running time of the simulator is within a polynomial of that of A. Thus, it would seem like secure computation implies that any "poly"-robust equilibrium can be implemented. However, the utility function in the game considers the complexity of each execution of the computation. So, even if the worst-case running time ofÃ is polynomially related to that of A, the utility of corresponding executions might be quite different. This difference may have a significant effect on the equilibrium. To make the argument go through we need a simulation that preserves complexity in an execution-by-execution manner. This is exactly what precise zero knowledge [Micali and Pass 2006] does. Thus, intuitively, the degradation in computational robustness by a universal implementation corresponds to the precision of a secure computation.
More precisely, to show that a machine profile M is a universal implementation, we need to show that whenever Λ is a p-robust equilibrium in a game G with mediator F, then M is an ǫ-equilibrium (with the communication mediator comm). Our proof proceeds by contradiction: we show that a deviating strategy M ′ Z (for a coalition controlling Z) for the ǫ-equilibrium M can be turned into a deviating strategyM Z for the p-robust equilibrium Λ. We here use the fact that M is a weak precise secure computation to find the machineM Z ; intuitivelyM Z will be the simulator for M ′ Z . The key step in the proof is a method for embedding any coalition machine game G into a distinguisher D that "emulates" the role of the utility function in G. If done appropriately, this ensures that the utility of the (simulator) strategyM Z is close to the utility of the strategy M ′ Z , which contradicts the assumption that Λ is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium.
The main obstacle in embedding the utility function of G into a distinguisher D is that the utility of a machineM Z in G depends not only on the types and actions of the players, but also on the complexity of runningM Z . In contrast, the distinguisher D does not get the complexity ofM as input (although it gets its output v). On a high level (and oversimplifying), to get around this problem, we let D compute the utility assuming (incorrectly) thatM Z has complexity c = C (M ′ , v) (i.e., the complexity of M ′ Z in the view v output byM Z ). Suppose, for simplicity, thatM Z is always "precise" (i.e., it always respects the complexity bounds). 13 Then it follows that (since the complexity c is always close to the actual complexity ofM Z in every execution) the utility computed by D corresponds to the utility of some gameG that is at most a p-speed up of G.
(To ensure thatG is indeed a speedup and not a "slow-down", we need to take special care with simulators that potentially run faster than the adversary they are simulating. The monotonicity of G helps us to circumvent this problem.) Thus, although we are not able to embed G into the distinguisher D, we can embed a related gameG into D. This suffices to show that Λ is not a Nash equilibrium inG, contradicting the assumption that Λ is a p-robust Nash equilibrium. A similar argument can be used to show that ⊥ is also an ǫ-best response to M −Z if ⊥ is a p-robust best response to Λ −Z , demonstrating that M in fact is a strong universal implementation.
Strong universal implementation implies weak precise secure computation.
To show that strong universal implementation implies weak precise secure computation, we again proceed by contradiction. We show how the existence of a distinguisher D and an adversary M ′ Z that cannot be simulated by any machineM Z can be used to construct a game G for which M is not a strong implementation. The idea is to have a utility function that assigns high utility to some "simple" strategy M * Z . In the mediated game with F, no strategy can get better utility than M * Z . On the other hand, in the cheap-talk game, the strategy M ′ Z does get higher utility than M * Z . As D indeed is a function that "distinguishes" a mediated execution from a cheap-talk game, our approach will be to try to embed the distinguisher D into the game G. The choice of G depends on whether M ′ Z = ⊥. We now briefly describe these games. If M ′ Z = ⊥, then there is no simulator for the machine ⊥ that simply halts. In this case, we construct a game G where using ⊥ results in a utility that is determined by running the distinguisher. (Note that ⊥ can be easily identified, since it is the only strategy that has complexity 0.) All other strategies instead get some canonical utility d, which is higher than the utility of ⊥ in the mediated game. However, since ⊥ cannot be "simulated", playing ⊥ in the cheap-talk game leads to an even higher utility, contradicting the assumption that M is a universal implementation.
If M ′ Z = ⊥, we construct a game G ′ in which each strategy other than ⊥ gets a utility that is determined by running the distinguisher. Intuitively, efficient strategies (i.e., strategies that have relatively low complexity compared to M ′ Z ) that output views on which the distinguisher outputs 1 with high probability get high utility. On the other hand, ⊥ gets a utility d that is at least as good as what the other strategies can get in the mediated game with F. This makes ⊥ a best response in the mediated game; in fact, we can define the game G ′ so that it is actually a p-robust best response. However, it is not even an ǫ-best-response in the cheap-talk game: M ′ Z gets higher utility, as it receives a view that cannot be simulated. (The output-invariant condition on the complexity function C is used to argue that M ′ Z can output its view at no cost.)
Universal Implementation for Specific Classes of Games
Our equivalence result might seem like a negative results. It demonstrates that considering only rational players (as opposed to adversarial players) does not facilitate protocol design. Note, however, that for the equivalence to hold, we must consider implementations universal with respect to essentially all games. In many settings, it might be reasonable to consider implementations universal with respect to only certain subclasses of games; in such scenarios, universal implementations may be significantly simpler or more efficient, and may also circumvent traditional lower bounds. We list some natural restrictions on classes of games below, and discuss how such restrictions can be leveraged in protocol design. These examples illustrate some of the benefits of a fully gametheoretic notion of security that does not rely on the standard cryptographic simulation paradigm.
Games with punishment: Many natural situations can be described as games where players can choose actions that "punish" an individual player i. For instance, this punishment can represent the cost of being excluded from future interactions. Intuitively, games with punishment model situations where players do not want to be caught cheating. Punishment strategies (such as the grim-trigger strategy in repeated prisoner's dilemma, where a player defects forever once his opponent defects once [Axelrod 1984] ) are extensively used in the game-theory literature. We give two examples where cryptographic protocol design is facilitated when requiring only implementations that are universal with respect to games with punishment.
Efficiency: As observed by Malkhi et al. [2004] , and more recently formalized by Aumann and Lindell [2006] , in situations were players do not want to be caught cheating, it is easier to construct efficient protocols. Using our framework we can formalize this intuition in a straightforward way. For concreteness, consider classes of normalized 2-player games, where the expected utility for both players in every Nash equilibrium is β, but where player 1 − i receives payoff α < β if player i outputs the string punish. Assume first that α = 0 and β = 1/2, that is, the Nash equilibrium strategy gives utility 1/2 but a "punished" player gets 0. In such a setting, it is sufficient to come up with protocols which guarantee that a cheating player is caught with probability 1/2; to prevent cheating simply "punish" a player that gets caught cheating. It follows that the utility of cheating is bounded by 1/2 × 1 + 1/2 × 0 = 1/2. By the same argument it follows that for general α, β, it is sufficient to have a protocol where a cheating player gets caught with probability
Fairness: It is well-known that, for many functions, secure 2-player computation where both players receive output is impossible if we require fairness (i.e., that either both or neither of the players receives an output) [Goldreich 2004 ]. Such impossibility results can be easily circumvented by considering universal implementation with respect to games with punishment. This follows from the fact that although it is impossible to get secure computation with fairness, the weaker notion of secure computation with abort [Goldwasser and Lindell 2002] is achievable. Intuitively, this notion guarantees that the only attack possible is one where one of the players prevents the other player from getting its output; this is called an "abort". To get a universal implementations with respect to games with punishment, it is thus sufficient to use any (weak) precise secure computation protocol with abort (see [Goldwasser and Lindell 2002; Micali and Pass 2007] ) modified so that players output punish if the other player aborts. It immediately follows that a player can never get a higher utility by aborting (as this will be detected by the other player, and consequently the aborting player will be punished). This result can be viewed as a generalization of the approach of [Dodis, Halevi, and Rabin 2000] . 14 Games with switching cost: Unlike perfectly-secure protocols, computationally-secure protocols protocols inherently have a non-zero error probability. For instance, secure 2-player computation can be achieved only with computational security (with non-zero error probability). By our equivalence result, it follows that universal implementations with respect to the most general classes of 2-player games also require non-zero error probability. This is no longer the case for implementations universal with respect to restricted classes of games.
Consider, for example, a scenario where the complexities of M and Λ F are 1, while all other machines (except ⊥) have complexity at least 2. As mentioned earlier, every game G where M is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium, can be transformed into another game G ′ where M is a true Nash equilibrium: G ′ is identical to G except that all strategies with complexity different than 2 are penalized ǫ. This penalty can be though of as the cost of searching for a better algorithm, or the cost of implementing the new algorithm; such a cost seems reasonable in situations where the algorithm M is freely available to the players (e.g., it is accessible on a web-page), but any other strategy requires some implementation cost. Of course, in such a setting it might seem unreasonable that the machine ⊥ (which does nothing) is penalized. Luckily, to get universal implementations with respect to two-player games, we do not require a penalty for using ⊥: it is easily seen that in all traditional secure computation protocols, playing ⊥ can never be a profitable deviation. 15 Thus, it is sufficient to penalize all machine with complexity at least 2.
Strictly monotone games: In our equivalence results we considered monotone games, where players never prefer to compute more. It is sometimes reasonable to assume that players strictly prefer to compute less. We outline two possible advantages of considering universal implementations with respect to strictly monotone games.
Error-free implementations:
Considering universality with respect to only strictly monotone games gives another approach for achieving error-free implementations. This seems particularly promising if we consider an idealized model where cryptographic functionalities (such as one-way functions) are modeled as black-boxes (see, e.g., the random oracle model of Bellare and Rogaway [1993] ), and the complexity function considers the number of calls to the cryptographic function. Intuitively, if the computational cost of trying to break the cryptographic function (e.g., we need to evaluate the one-way function at least one more time) is higher than the expected gain, it is not worth deviating from the protocol.
Fairness One vein of research on secure computation considers protocols for achieving fair exchanges using gradual-release protocols (see e.g., [Boneh and Naor 2000] ). In a gradualrelease protocol, the players are guaranteed that if at any point one player "aborts", then the other player(s) can compute the output within a comparable amount of time (say within twice the time). By making appropriate assumptions about the utility of computation, we can ensure that players never have incentives to deviate. Intuitively, if the cost of computing t extra steps is positive, even if the other player computes, say 2t, extra steps, it will never be worth it for a player to abort. 16
Conclusion
We have defined a general approach to taking computation into account in game theory that subsumes previous approaches, and shown a close connection between computationally robust Nash equilibria and precise secure computation. This opens the door to a number of exciting research directions, in both secure computation and game theory. We briefly describe a few here:
• We have illustrated some situations where universal implementations with respect to restricted classes of games facilitates protocol design. More generally, we believe that combining computational assumptions with assumptions about utility will be a fruitful line of research for secure computation. For instance, it is conceivable that difficulties associated with concurrent executability of protocols could be alleviated by making assumptions regarding the cost of message scheduling; the direction of Cohen, Kilian, and Petrank [2001] (where players who delay messages are themselves punished with delays) seems relevant in this regard.
• Our notion of universal implementation uses Nash equilibrium as solution concept. It is well known that in (traditional) extensive form games (i.e., games defined by a game tree), a Nash equilibrium might prescribe non-optimal moves at game histories that do no occur on the equilibrium path. This can lead to "empty threats": "punishment" strategies that are nonoptimal and thus not credible. Many recent works on implementation (see e.g., [Gerardi 2004; Izmalkov, Lepinski, and Micali 2008] ) therefore focus on stronger solution concepts such as sequential equilibrium . We note that when taking computation into account, the distinction between credible and non-credible threats becomes more subtle: the threat of using a non-optimal strategy in a given history might be credible if, for instance, the overall complexity of the strategy is smaller than any strategy that is optimal at every history. Thus, a simple strategy that is non-optimal off the equilibrium path might be preferred to a more complicated (and thus more costly) strategy that performs better off the equilibrium path (indeed, people often use non-optimal but simple "rules-of-thumbs" when making decisions). Finding a good definition of empty threats in games with computation costs seems challenging.
• As we have seen, universal implementation is equivalent to a variant of precise secure computation with reversed quantifier. It would be interesting to find a notion of implementation that corresponds more closely to the standard definition without a change in the order of quantifier; in particular, whereas the traditional definition of zero-knowledge guarantees deniability (i.e., the property that the interaction does not leave any "trace"), the new one does not. Finding a game-theoretic definition that also captures deniability seems like an interesting question.
• As we have seen, Nash equilibria do not always exist in games with computation. This leaves open the question of what the appropriate solution concept is. The issue of finding an appropriate solution concept becomes of particular interest in extensive-form games. As mentioned above, it is more standard in such games to consider refinements of Nash equilibrium such as sequential equilibrium. Roughly speaking, in a sequential equilibrium, every player must make a best response at every information set, where an information set is a set of nodes in the game tree that the agent cannot distinguish. The standard assumption in game theory is that the information set is given exogenously, as part of the description of the game tree. As Halpern [1997] has argued, an exogenously-given information set does not always represent the information that an agent actually has. The issue becomes even more significant in our framework. While an agent may have information that allows him to distinguish two nodes, the computation required to realize that they are different may be prohibitive, and (with computational costs) an agent can rationally decide not to do the computation. This suggests that the information sets should be determined by the machine. More generally, in defining solution concepts, it has proved necessary to reason about players' beliefs about other players' beliefs; now these beliefs will have to include beliefs regarding computation. Finding a good model of such beliefs seems challenging.
• A natural next step would be to introduce notions of computation in the epistemic logic. There has already been some work in this direction (see, for example, [Halpern, Moses, and Tuttle 1988; Halpern, Moses, and Vardi 1994; Moses 1988] ). We believe that combining the ideas of this paper with those of the earlier papers will allow us to get, for example, a cleaner knowledgetheoretic account of zero knowledge than that given by Halpern, Moses, and Tuttle [1988] .
• Finally, it would be interesting to use behavioral experiments to, for example, determine the "cost of computation" in various games (such as the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma).
The real execution Let f be an m-ary functionality, let Π be a protocol for computing f , and let A be a machine that controls the same set Z of players asÃ. We characterize the real execution of Π given adversary A using a function denoted real Π,A that maps an input vector x, an auxiliary input z, and a tuple r ∈ ({0, 1} ∞ ) m+1−|Z| (m − |Z| random strings for the players not in Z and a random string for the adversary A), to a triple ( x, y, v) , where y is the output of players 1, . . . , m, and v is the view of A that results from executing protocol Π on inputs x, when players i ∈ Z are controlled by the adversary A, who is given auxiliary input z. As before, we often suppress the vector of random bitstrings r and write real Π,A ( x, z).
We now formalize the notion of precise secure computation. For convenience, we slightly generalize the definition of [Micali and Pass 2006 ] to consider general adversary structures [Hirt and Maurer 2000] . More precisely, we assume that the specification of a secure computation protocol includes a set Z of subsets of players, where the adversary is allowed to corrupt only the players in one of the subsets in Z; the definition of [Micali and Pass 2006; Goldreich, Micali, and Wigderson 1987] considers only threshold adversaries where Z consists of all subsets up to a pre-specified size k. We first provide a definition of precise computation in terms of running time, as in [Micali and Pass 2006] , although other complexity functions could be used; we later consider general complexity functions.
We use a complexity function steps, which, on input a machine M and a view v, roughly speaking, gives the number of "computational steps" taken by M in the view v. In counting computational steps, we assume a representation of machines such that a machine M , given as input an encoding of another machine A and an input x, can emulate the computation of A on input x with only linear overhead. (Note that this is clearly the case for "natural" memory-based models of computation. An equivalent representation is a universal Turing machine that receives the code it is supposed to run on one input tape.)
In the following definition, we say that a function is negligible if it is asymptotically smaller than the inverse of any fixed polynomial. More precisely, a function ν : IN → IR is negligible if, for all c > 0, there exists some n c such that ν(n) < n −c for all n > n c .
Roughly speaking, a computation is secure if the ideal execution cannot be distinguished from the real execution. To make this precise, a distinguisher is used. Formally, a distinguisher gets as input a bitstring z, a triple ( x, y, v) (intuitively, the output of either ideal f,Ã or real Π,A on ( x, z) and some appropriate-length tuple of random strings) and a random string r, and outputs either 0 or 1. As usual, we typically suppress the random bitstring and write, for example, 
18 Note that the three occurrences of PrU in the first two clauses represent slightly different probability measures, although this is hidden by the fact that we have omitted the superscripts. The first occurrence of PrU should be Pr m−|Z|+3 U , should we are taking the probability over the m + 2 − |Z| random inputs to real f,A and the additional random input to D; similarly, the second and third occurrences of PrU should be Pr Π is a Z-secure computation of f with precision p and (T, ǫ)-computational error if it satisfies the two conditions above with the adversary A and the distinguisher D restricted to being computable by a TM with running time bounded by T (·).
Protocol Π is a Z-secure computation of f with statistical precision p if there exists some negligible function ǫ such that Π is a Z-secure computation of f with precision p and ǫ-statistical error. Finally, protocol Π is a Z-secure computation of f with computational precision p if for every polynomial T , there exists some negligible function ǫ such that Π is a Z-secure computation of f with precision p and (T, ǫ)-computational error.
The traditional notion of secure computation is obtained by replacing condition 2 with the requirement that the worst-case running-time ofÃ is polynomially related to the worst-case running time of A.
We will be most interested in secure computation protocols with precision p where p(n, 0) = 0; such functions are called homogeneous. In our setting (where only the machine ⊥ has complexity 0), this property essentially says that the adversary running ⊥ in the ideal execution (i.e., abortingnot sending any messages to the trusted third party and writing nothing on all the output tapes of players in Z) must be a valid simulator of the adversary running ⊥ in the real execution.
The following theorems were provided by Pass [2007, 2006] , using the results of [Ben-Or, Goldwasser, and Wigderson 1988; Goldreich, Micali, and Wigderson 1987] . Let Z m t denote all the subsets of [m] containing t or less elements. This result can also be extended to more general adversary structures by relying on the results of [Hirt and Maurer 2000] . We can also consider secure computation of specific 2-party functionalities.
Theorem A.3 Suppose that there exists an enhanced trapdoor permutation. For every 2-ary function f where only one party gets an output (i.e., f 1 (·) = 0), there exists a a homogeneous precision function p and protocol Π such that p(n, t) = O(t) and Π Z 2 1 -securely computes f with computational-precision p.
[ Micali and Pass 2006 ] also obtains unconditional results (using statistical security) for the special case of zero-knowledge proofs. We refer the reader to [Micali and Pass 2006; Pass 2006] for more details.
A.1 Weak Precise Secure Computation
Universal implementation is not equivalent to precise secure computation, but to a (quite natural) weakening of it. Weak precise secure computation, which we are about to define, differs from precise secure computation in the following respects:
• Just as in traditional definition of zero knowledge [Goldwasser, Micali, and Rackoff 1989] , precise zero knowledge requires that for every adversary, there exists a simulator that, on all inputs, produces an interaction that no distinguisher can distinguish from the real interaction. This simulator must work for all inputs and all distinguishers. In analogy with the notion of "weak zero knowledge" [Dwork, Naor, Reingold, and Stockmeyer 2003] , we here switch the order of the quantifiers and require instead that for every input distribution Pr over x ∈ ({0, 1} n ) m and z ∈ {0, 1} * , and every distinguisher D, there exists a (precise) simulator that "tricks" D; in essence, we allow there to be a different simulator for each distinguisher. As argued by Dwork et al. [2003] , this order of quantification is arguably reasonable when dealing with concrete security. To show that a computation is secure in every concrete setting, it suffices to show that, in every concrete setting (where a "concrete setting" is characterized by an input distribution and the distinguisher used by the adversary), there is a simulator.
• We further weaken this condition by requiring only that the probability of the distinguisher outputting 1 on a real view be (essentially) no higher than the probability of outputting 1 on a simulated view. In contrast, the traditional definition requires these probabilities to be (essentially) equal. If we think of the distinguisher outputting 1 as meaning that the adversary has learned some important feature, then we are saying that the likelihood of the adversary learning an important feature in the real execution is essentially no higher than that of the adversary learning an important feature in the "ideal" computation. This condition on the distinguisher is in keeping with the standard intuition of the role of the distinguisher.
• We allow the adversary and the simulator to depend not only on the probability distribution, but also on the particular security parameter n (in contrast, the definition of [Dwork, Naor, Reingold, and Sto is uniform) . That is why, when considering weak precise secure computation with (T, ǫ)-computational error, we require that the adversary A and the simulator D be computable by circuits of size at most T (n) (with a possibly different circuit for each n), rather than a Turing machine with running time T (n). Again, this is arguably reasonable in a concrete setting, where the security parameter is known.
• We also allow the computation not to meet the precision bounds with a small probability. The obvious way to do this is to change the requirement in the definition of precise secure computation by replacing 1 by 1 − ǫ, to get
where n is the input length. We change this requirement in two ways. First, rather than just requiring that this precision inequality hold for all x and z, we require that the probability of the inequality holding be at least 1 − ǫ for all distributions Pr over x ∈ ({0, 1} n ) m and z ∈ {0, 1} * .
The second difference is to add an extra argument to the distinguisher, which tells the distinguisher whether the precision requirement is met. In the real computation, we assume that the precision requirement is always met, thus, whenever it is not met, the distinguisher can distinguish the real and ideal computations. We still want the probability that the distinguisher can distinguish the real and ideal computations to be at most ǫ(n). For example, our definition disallows a scenario where the complexity bound is not met with probability ǫ(n)/2 and the distinguisher can distinguish the computations with (without taking the complexity bound into account) with probability ǫ(n)/2.
• In keeping with the more abstract approach used in the definition of robust implementation, the definition of weak precise secure computation is parametrized by the abstract complexity measure C , rather than using steps. This just gives us a more general definition; we can always instantiate C to measure running time.
Definition A.4 (Weak Precise Secure Computation) Let f , Π, Z, p, and ǫ be as in the definition of precise secure computation. Protocol Π is a weak Z-secure computation of f with and ǫ-statistical error if, for all n ∈ N , all Z ∈ Z, all real-execution adversaries A that control the players in Z, all distinguishers D, and all probability distributions Pr over ({0, 1} n ) m × {0, 1} * , there exists an ideal-execution adversaryÃ that controls the players in Z such that
where precise Z,A,Ã (n, v) = 1 if and only if C Z (Ã, v) ≤ p(n, C Z (A,Ã(v))). 19 Π is a weak Z-secure computation of f with precision p and (T, ǫ)-computational error if it satisfies the two conditions above with the adversary A and the distinguisher D restricted to being computable by a randomized circuit of size T (n). Protocol Π is a Z-weak secure computation of f with statistical C -precision p if there exists some negligible function ǫ such that Π is a Z-weak secure computation of f with precision p and statistical ǫ-error. Finally, Protocol Π is a Z-weak secure computation of f with computational C -precision p if for every polynomial T (·), there exists some negligible function ǫ such that Π is a Z-weak secure computation of f with precision p and (T, ǫ)-computational error.
Our terminology suggests that weak precise secure computation is weaker than precise secure computation. This is almost immediate from the definitions if C Z (M, v) = steps(M, v) for all Z ∈ Z. A more interesting setting considers a complexity measure that can depend on steps(M, v) and the size of the description of M . It directly follows by inspection that Theorems A.2 and A.3 also hold if, for example,
for all Z ∈ Z, since the simulators in those results only incur a constant additive overhead. (This is not a coincidence. As argued in [Micali and Pass 2006; Pass 2006] , the definition of precise simulation guarantees the existence of a "universal" simulator S, with "essentially" the same precision, that works for every adversary A, provided that S also gets the code of A; namely given a real-execution adversary A, the idealexecution adversaryÃ = S(A). 20 Since |S| = O(1), it follows that |Ã| = |S| + |A| = O(|A|).) That is, we have the following variants of Theorems A.2 and A.3:
then there exists a homogeneous precision function p and a protocol Π such that p(n, t) = O(t) and Π weak Z m ⌈m/3⌉−1 -securely computes f with C -precision p and 0-statistical error.
Theorem A.6 Suppose that there exists an enhanced trapdoor permutation, and
For every 2-ary function f where only one party gets an output (i.e., f 1 (·) = 0), there exists a a homogeneous precision function p and protocol Π such that p(n, t) = O(t) and Π weak Z 2 1 -securely computes f with computational C -precision p.
B Proof of Theorem 4.2
In this section, we prove Theorem 4.2. Recall that for one direction of our main theorem we require that certain operations, like moving output from one tape to another, do not incur any additional complexity. We now make this precise. We remark that our results would still hold if we weakened the two conditions above to allow the complexities to be close, but not necessarily equal, by allowing some overhead in complexity (at the cost of some slackness in the parameters of the theorem).
We now prove each direction of Theorem 4.2 separately, to make clear what assumptions we need for each part. We start with the "only if" direction. The following result strengthens the "only if" direction, by requiring only that C is M -acceptable (and not necessarily output-invariant). Proof: Suppose that M is a weak Z-secure computation of f with C -precision p and ǫ-statistical error. Since M computes f , for every game G ∈ G C , the action profile induced by M in (G, comm) is identically distributed to the action profile induced by Λ F in (G, F). We now show that ( M , comm) is a (G C , Z, p)-universal implementation of F with error ǫ.
Proof: Let G ∈ G C be a game with input length n such that Λ F is a p(n, ·)-robust Z-safe equilibrium in (G, F). We show that M is a Z-safe ǫ(n)-equilibrium in (G, comm) . Recall that this is equivalent to showing that no coalition of players Z ∈ Z can increase their utility by more than ǫ(n) by deviating from their prescribed strategies. In other words, for all Z ∈ Z and machines M ′ Z , we need to show that
Suppose, by way of contradiction, that there exists some machine M ′ Z such that
We now obtain a contradiction by showing that there exists some other gameG that is at most a p(n, ·)-speedup of G and a machineM Z such that
This contradicts the assumption that Λ F is a p-robust equilibrium. Note that the machine M ′ Z can be viewed as a real-execution adversary controlling the players in Z. The machineM Z will be defined as the simulator for M ′ Z for some appropriately defined input distribution Pr on T × {0, 1} * and distinguisher D. Intuitively, Pr will be the type distribution in the game G (where z is nature's type), and the distinguisher D will capture the utility function u Z . There is an obvious problem with using the distinguisher to capture the utility function: the distinguisher outputs a single bit, whereas the utility function outputs a real. To get around this problem, we define a probabilistic distinguisher that outputs 1 with a probability that is determined by the expected utility; this is possible since the game is normalized, so the expected utility is guaranteed to be in [0, 1] . We also cannot quite use the same distribution for the machine M as for the game G. The problem is that, if G ∈ G is a canonical game with input length n, the types in G have the form x; z, where x ∈ {0, 1} n . The protocol Λ F i in (G, comm) ignores the z, and sends the mediator the x. On the other hand, in a secure computation, the honest players provide their input (i.e., their type) to the mediator. Thus, we must convert a type x i z i of a player i in the game G to a type x for Λ F i . More formally, we proceed as follows. Suppose that G is a canonical game with input length n, and the type space of G is T . Given t = (x 1 z 1 
is acceptable, let t x,z be the element of T determined this way. If Pr G is the probability distribution over types, Pr( x, z) = Pr G ( t x,z ) if ( x, z) is acceptable, and Pr( x, z) = 0 otherwise.
Define the probabilistic distinguisher D as follows: if precise = 0 or ( x, z) is not acceptable, then D(z, ( x, y, view ), precise) = 0; otherwise D(z, ( x, y, view ), precise) = 1 with probability
Z as a real-execution adversary controlling the players in Z, the definition of weak precise secure computation guarantees that, for the distinguisher D and the distribution Pr described above, there exists a simulatorM Z such that
We can assume without loss of generality that ifM Z sends no messages and outputs nothing, theñ M Z = ⊥. We next define a new complexity function C that, by construction, will be at most a p(n, ·)-speedup of C . Intuitively, this complexity function will consider the speedup required to make up for the "overhead" of the simulatorM Z when simulating M ′ Z . To ensure that the speedup is not too large, we incur it only on views where the simulation byM Z is "precise". Specifically, let the complexity function C be identical to C , except that if
(Note thatṽ is a view for the ideal execution. M ′ Z runs in the real execution, so we need to give it as input the view output byM Z given viewṽ, namely v. Recall that the simulatorM Z is trying to reconstruct the view of M ′ Z . Also, note that we did not defineC
, for thenC Z would not be a speedup of C Z . Finally, we remark that we rely on the fact that the precision function p is homogeneous, and so p(n, 0) = 0. This ensures thatC Z assigns 0 complexity only to ⊥, as is required for a complexity function.) By construction,C Z is at most a p(n, ·)-speedup of C Z . LetG be identical to G except that the complexity function is C . It is immediate thatG is at most a p(n, ·)-speedup of G.
We claim that it follows from the definition of D that
To see this, let a Z ( t, r) (resp., a i ( t, r)) denote the output thatM Z places on the output tapes of the players in Z (resp., the output of player i / ∈ Z) when the strategy profile (M Z , Λ F −Z ) is used Since M and F both compute f (and thus must have the same distribution over outcomes), it follows that
For the last equality, recall thatG is identical to G except for the complexity ofM Z (and hence the utility of strategy profiles involvingM Z ). Thus, the last equality follows once we show that (Λ F ) b Z =M Z . This follows from the various technical assumptions we have made. If (Λ F ) b Z =M Z , thenM Z sends no messages (all the messages sent by Λ F to the communication mediator are ignored, since they have the wrong form), and does not output anything (since messages from the communication mediator are not signed by F). Thus,M Z acts like ⊥. By assumption, this means thatM Z = ⊥, soM Z = (Λ F ) b Z . From (7) and (8), we conclude that
which gives the desired contradiction.
It remains to show that ( M , comm) is also a strong (G C , Z, p)-universal implementation of F with error ǫ. That is, if ⊥ is a p(n, ·)-best response to Λ F −Z ) in (G, F) then ⊥ an ǫ-best response to M −Z in (G, comm). Suppose, by way of contradiction, that there exists some M ′ Z such that
It follows using the same proof as in Claim B.3 that there exists a gameG that is at most a p(n, ·) speedup of G and a machineM Z such that
But this contradicts the assumption that ⊥ is a p(n, ·)-robust best response to Λ F −Z in (G, F). We now prove the "if" direction of Theorem 4.2. For this direction, we need the assumption that C is output-invariant. Moreover, we get a slightly weaker implication: we show only that for every ǫ, ǫ ′ such that ǫ ′ < ǫ it holds that strong universal implementation with error ǫ ′ implies weak secure computation with error ǫ. After proving this result, we introduce some additional restrictions on C that suffice to prove the implication for the case when ǫ ′ = ǫ.
Theorem B.4 Suppose that M , f, F, Z are as above, ǫ ′ < ǫ, and C is an M -acceptable outputinvariant complexity function. If ( M , comm) is a strong (G C , Z, p)-universal implementation of F with error ǫ ′ , then M is a weak Z-secure computation of f with C -precision p and error ǫ.
Proof: Let ( M , comm) be a (G C , Z, p)-universal implementation of F with error ǫ(·). We show that M Z-securely computes f with C -precision p(·, ·) and error ǫ(·). Suppose, by way of contradiction, that there exists some n ∈ IN , a distribution Pr on ({0, 1} n ) m × {0, 1} * , a subset Z ∈ Z, a distinguisher D, and a machine M ′ Z ∈ M that controls the players in Z such that for all machines M Z ∈ M, 
To obtain a contradiction we consider two cases: 
Equation (13) is now immediate from (11), (14), and (15). Thus, we can assume without loss of generality that M ′ Z is such that, when M ′ Z has view v, the output of player i Z is y; v. We now define a game G ∈ G C such that ⊥ is a p(n, ·)-robust best response to Λ F −Z in (G, F), but ⊥ is not an ǫ-best response to M −Z in (G, comm) . Intuitively, G is such that simply playing ⊥ guarantees a high payoff. However, if a coalition controlling Z can provide a view that cannot be "simulated", then it receives an even higher payoff. By definition, it will be hard to find such a view in the mediated game. However, by our assumption that M is not a secure computation protocol, it is possible for the machine controlling Z to obtain such a view in the cheap-talk game.
In more detail, we proceed as follows. Let N , ((t 1 , . . . , t m ), a, v), 1) = 1) if a i Z = y; v, 0 < p(n, c Z ) ≤ p(n, C Z (M ′ Z , v)) 0 otherwise.
Clearly, G ∈ G C .
Claim B.5 ⊥ is a p(n, ·)-robust best response to Λ F −Z in (G, F).
Proof: Suppose, by way of contradiction, that there exists some gameG with complexity profile C that is at most a p(n, ·)-speedup of G and a machine M * Z such that
It is immediate from (17) that M * Z = ⊥. Thus, it follows from the definition of complexity functions thatC (M * Z , v) = 0 for all v ∈ {0, 1} * . That means that when calculating u (G,F ) (M * Z , Λ F −Z ), the has a maximal element d, then by (11), equation (18) would hold with strict inequality, and thus theorem B.4 would hold even if ǫ ′ = ǫ. We can ensure this by introducing some additional technical (but natural) restrictions on C . For instance, suppose that C is such that for every complexity bound c, the number of machines that have complexity at most c is finite, i.e., for every c ∈ IN , there exists some constant N such that |{M ∈ M : ∃v ∈ {0, 1} * C (M, v) ≤ c}| = N . Under this assumption S is finite and thus has a maximal element.
C A Computational Equivalence Theorem
To prove a "computational" analogue of our equivalence theorem (relating computational precise secure computation and universal implementation), we need to introduce some further restrictions on the complexity functions, and the classes of games considered.
• A (vector of) complexity functions C is efficient if each function is computable by a (randomized) polynomial-sized circuit.
• A secure computation game G = ([m], M, Pr, C , u) with input length n is said to be T (·)-machine universal if -the machine set M is the set of Turing machines implementable by T (n)-sized randomized circuits, and -u is computable by a T (n)-sized circuits.
Let G C ,T denote the class of T (·)-machine universal, normalized, monotone, canonical Cgames. Proof Sketch: The proof follows the same lines as that of Theorem B.2. Assume that M computes f with computational C -precision p. Since M computes f , it follows that for every polynomial T and game G ∈ G C ,T , the action profile induced by M in (G, comm) is identically distributed to the action profile induced by Λ F in (G, F). We now show that, for every polynomial T , there exists some negligible function ǫ such that ( M , comm) is a (G C ,T , Z, p)-universal implementation of F with error ǫ. Assume, by way of contradiction, that there exists polynomials T and g and infinitely many n ∈ N such that the following conditions hold:
• there exists some machine M ′ Z ∈ M such that
.
It follows using the same proof as in Proposition B.2 that this contradicts the weak secure computation property of M . In fact, to apply this proof, we only need to make sure that the distinguisher D constructed can be implemented by a polynomial-sized circuit. However, since by our assumption C is efficient and u is T (·)-sized computable, it follows that D can be constructed efficiently. Strong universal implementation follows in the same way. 
As in the proof of Theorem B.4 we construct a game G that contradicts the assumption that M is a strong universal implementation. The only thing that needs to be changed is that we need to prove that the game G constructed is in G C ,T ′ for some polynomial T ′ . That is, we need to prove that u can be computed by poly-sized circuits (given than D is poly-size computable). We do not know how to show that the actual utility function u Z constructed in the proof of Proposition B.4 can be made efficient. However, for each polynomial g ′ , we can approximate it to within an additive factor of 1 g ′ (n) using polynomial-sized circuits (by repeated sampling); this is sufficient to show that there exists some T ′ and some polynomial g ′′ such that that M is not a 1 g ′′ (n) -equilibrium in (G, comm).
Relating Universal Implementation and "Standard" Secure Computation We note that Theorem C.1 also provides a game-theoretic characterization of the "standard" (i.e., "non-precise") notion of secure computation. We simply consider the complexity function worstcase(v) that is the sum of the worst-case running-time of M on inputs of the same length as in the view v, and the size of M . With this complexity function, the definition of weak precise secure computation reduces to the traditional notion of weak secure computation without precision (or, more precisely, with "worst-case" precision just as in the traditional definition). Given this complexity function, the precision of a secure computation protocol becomes the traditional "overhead" of the simulator (this is also called knowledge tightness [Goldreich, Micali, and Wigderson 1991] ).
Roughly speaking, "weak secure computation" with overhead p (where p is a homogeneous function) is thus equivalent to strong (G worstcase,poly , p)-universal implementation with negligible error.
